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ARTICLES 
THE FUTURE OF EMOTIONAL HARM 
Betsy J. Grey* 
 
Why should tort law treat claims for emotional harm as a second-class 
citizen?  Judicial skepticism about these claims is long entrenched, justified 
by an amalgam of perceived problems ranging from proof difficulties for 
causation and the need to constrain fraudulent claims, to the ubiquity of the 
injury, and a concern about open-ended liability.  To address this jumble of 
justifications, the law has developed a series of duty limitations to curb the 
claims and preclude them from reaching the jury for individualized 
analysis.  The limited duty approach to emotional harm is maintained by 
the latest iteration of the Restatement (Third) of Torts. 
This Article argues that many of the justifications for curtailing this tort 
have been discredited by scientific developments.  In particular, the rapid 
advances in neuroscience give greater insight into the changes that occur in 
the brain from emotional harm.  Limited duty tests should no longer be used 
as proxies for validity or justified by the presumed untrustworthiness of the 
claim.  Instead, validity evidence for emotional harm claims—like evidence 
of physical harm—should be entrusted to juries.  This approach will 
reassert the jury’s role as the traditional factfinder, promote corrective 
justice and deterrence values, and lead to greater equity for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress (NIED) claimants.  The traditional 
limitations on tort recovery, including the rules of evidence and causation, 
are more than adequate to avoid opening the floodgates to emotional 
distress claims. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In October 2002, four-year-old Daniel Ware, Jr., fell asleep on a school 
bus on his way to preschool.1  The driver accidentally left Daniel on the bus 
in the school district bus lot.2  When Daniel awoke, he got off the bus and 
began walking to the downtown pharmacy where his mother worked.3  A 
relative spotted him in a McDonald’s parking lot and returned him to his 
mother.4  For the next several months, Daniel was scared about going to 
school and sometimes needed a relative to take the bus with him.5  In 
March 2003, “Daniel became upset and vomited at school when he was told 
that he would be going on a bus field trip the next day.”6  At home, he cried 
and begged his mother not to make him go, and he vomited again.7  Three 
months later, he was diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).8 
Daniel’s parents brought suit against the preschool alleging negligent 
infliction of emotional distress (NIED) stemming from the bus incident.9  
The preschool moved for summary judgment.10  In its motion, the 
defendant did not dispute the diagnosis of PTSD or that the PTSD was the 
result of the bus incident.11  During the argument for summary judgment, 
the defense counsel was willing to concede, for purposes of the motion, that 
“this kid did sustain a real mental injury.”12  Instead, the preschool argued 
 
 1. Ware v. ANW Special Educ. Coop., 180 P.3d 610, 612 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 612–13. 
 12. Id. at 620 (Greene, J., dissenting) (emphasis removed) (citation omitted). 
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that Daniel did not suffer a compensable injury under Kansas law.13  The 
trial court granted summary judgment, which was upheld on appeal.14 
Why would a court leave a person like Daniel, whose emotional harm 
was undisputed, without a legal remedy?  In upholding the grant of 
summary judgment, the appellate court found that Daniel’s symptoms, 
including the vomiting, did not qualify as physical injuries or a physical 
impact, as required by Kansas law for NIED claims.15  The court stated that 
these requirements are based on “sound legal principle,” in order to 
“prevent plaintiffs from recovering for emotional distress that is feigned or 
counterfeit . . . . [E]motional distress is a common experience of life and is 
usually trivial.  Therefore, the courts limit recovery to cases involving 
severe emotional distress which is evidenced and substantiated by actual 
physical injury.”16 
The result in Daniel’s case typifies NIED claims in our civil justice 
system.  Courts are skeptical of the claims, so they erect barriers to prevent 
juries from ever hearing them.  This Article urges a different analysis.  
Given neuroscientific advances, courts should not fear a case-by-case 
examination of the NIED claim, with fact disputes over genuineness going 
to the jury.  Even though the U.S. Supreme Court has generalized that 
“claims for emotional injury [are] far less susceptible to objective medical 
proof than are their physical counterparts,”17 science is at a turning point in 
recognizing, ascertaining, and quantifying emotional pain.  The rapid 
advances in neuroscience give greater insight into the changes that occur in 
the brain from emotional harm.  These developments should matter to the 
judicial system and warrant individualized analysis of emotional harm 
claims.  If courts continue barring NIED claims, validity is no longer a 
defensible rationale.  Other values or moral judgments would need to justify 
the unique skepticism of these claims.18 
 The traditional—and current—view does not treat emotional harm 
and physical harm in parity.19  The Restatement (Third) of Torts treats 
emotional harms separately from physical harms, demanding a showing of 
“serious” emotional harm before the claim can proceed.20  It distinguishes 
bodily harm from emotional harm noting that “[u]sually the existence of 
bodily harm can be verified objectively while the existence and severity of 
 
 13. Id. at 612 (majority opinion). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 613–14. 
 16. Id. at 617 (quoting Reynolds v. Highland Manor, Inc., 954 P.2d 11, 13 (Kan. Ct. 
App. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 17. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 434 (1997) (quoting 
Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 552 (1994)). 
 18. See Betsy J. Grey, Neuroscience and Emotional Harm in Tort Law:  Rethinking the 
American Approach to Free-Standing Emotional Distress Claims, in LAW AND 
NEUROSCIENCE:  CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 211 (Michael Freeman ed., 2011). 
 19. Dov Fox & Alex Stein, Dualism and Doctrine, 90 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2015) 
(calling for treating physical and emotional harm in parity:  “bodification of harm doctrine 
underlies the federal and most state systems of torts”). 
 20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 47 (2012). 
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emotional harm is ordinarily dependent on self-reporting.”21  While courts 
continue to observe this distinction, other areas have changed course.  
Neuroscience has made significant advances in quantifying mental injury.22  
In the medical arena, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 5 (DSM-5) has 
arrived with a broadened view of psychiatric illness,23 and our normative 
views of emotional harm have changed as well.24 
Judicial skepticism about the NIED claim is long entrenched.  Part I 
briefly reviews the complicated and rather illogical history of the 
development of emotional harm tort claims in the United States.  This 
skepticism has been explained by an amalgam of reasons, including the lack 
of medical expertise, inherent proof difficulties for causation, the need to 
curtail fraudulent claims, the ubiquity of the injury, and the overriding 
concern of open-ended liability.25  Given this parade of concerns, courts do 
not apply ordinary negligence principles to NIED claims.  Instead, the law 
has developed a series of limiting duty tests to curtail the claim and 
determine whether it “merit[s] inclusion among the exceptions to the 
general rule of no liability.”26  These tests aim to prevent individualized 
analysis and to limit aggregate liability.27 
Can these tests be justified by the underlying theories of tort law?  That is 
the subject of Part II, which examines NIED claims in light of rights-based 
and instrumentalist theories of tort law.  From a rights-based point of view, 
tort law promotes the natural right to be free from injury as a result of the 
actions of others.  Under this view, victims of emotional harm are as 
deserving as victims of physical harm.  But rights do not necessarily have a 
counterpart in remedies, particularly in the NIED area.  Instrumentalist 
concerns predominate.  The fear of ripple effects of recognizing a remedy 
for emotional injury coincides with the value judgment that operates 
throughout tort jurisprudence:   namely, that physical harms are more 
important and deserving of compensation than emotional harms.28  Courts 
and legislatures always have been hesitant about compensating for losses 
that cannot readily be measured in dollars.29  There is also the concern that 
increased liability will inhibit productive activities for an arguably nebulous 
benefit.30  Thus, the balance of individual and social interests is struck 
 
 21. Id. § 45 cmt. a. 
 22. See infra Part III.A. 
 23. See infra Part III.B. 
 24. See infra Part III.C. 
 25. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 47 cmt. a. 
 26. Id. § 47 cmt. i (discussing the relationship between one of the limiting tests and the 
general foreseeability test used in negligence). 
 27. See Robert J. Rhee, A Principled Solution for Negligent Infliction of Emotional 
Distress Claims, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 805, 806 (2004). 
 28. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 
1625, 1668 (2002) (“[C]ourts have long given ‘second class’ citizenship to emotional 
distress . . . as harms or protected interests.”). 
 29. See John Diamond, Rethinking Compensation for Mental Distress:  A Critique of the 
Restatement (Third) §§ 45–47, 16 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 141, 153 (2008). 
 30. Id. at 153–54. 
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differently for negligently inflicted physical harm and negligently inflicted 
emotional harm.31 
In striking this balance, the definition of harm has become the central 
issue for NIED claims.  Part III offers three different perspectives from 
which to examine emotional harm—scientific, medical, and normative—
and demonstrates how developments in those areas have changed our 
understanding of emotional harm claims.  The argument that emotional 
injury is untrustworthy or cannot be adequately proved is losing its force.  
Technological developments, especially advances in neuroscience, soon 
may be able to provide reliable quantification evidence for emotional 
injury.32  If we choose not to treat emotional harm as equivalent to physical 
harms in tort law despite these advances, we will be forced to confront the 
reasons for the distinction more directly.  If we could eliminate factual 
concerns regarding validity and reliability, on what basis can we distinguish 
NIED claims for unequal treatment?   
Part IV argues that the time is ripe to remove limited duty barriers based 
on validity concerns in the NIED area.  Validity evidence for NIED claims, 
like evidence of physical harm, should be entrusted to juries.  This approach 
should alleviate the concern of using limited duty analysis to advance 
outdated or unjustified policy goals and lead to greater equity for NIED 
claimants.  Other instrumentalist concerns over NIED claims, such as 
unlimited liability, can be addressed in other ways, such as traditional duty 
and proximate cause analyses. 
Accordingly, in Part IV, this Article proposes that we should recast legal 
barriers that stem from questions of validity in emotional harm cases and 
test those questions through traditional evidentiary admissibility rules, 
allowing the fact-finder’s individualized analysis of the harm.  Under this 
approach, courts should not require special pleadings or reject a claim of 
emotional harm as a matter of law based on validity concerns but instead 
scrutinize the evidence through traditional evidentiary rules, including 
Daubert33 testing.  Assuming the evidence is admissible, the jury will fulfill 
its traditional role of individually assessing the validity of the injury on a 
case-by-case basis.  This approach would reassert the jury’s role as the 
traditional fact-finder and promote corrective justice and deterrence values, 
which have been overtaken by instrumentalist concerns.  Individuals like 
Daniel will not be deprived of a hearing because of outdated assumptions 
about failure of proof. 
 
 31. See id. at 177 (“The current approach to negligent infliction of mental distress 
appears to treat it as a wayward stepchild to be tolerated out of historical, if not family 
loyalty, but constrained, where not entrenched, to avoid further embarrassment.”); see also 
Martha Chamallas, Removing Emotional Harm from the Core of Tort Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 
751, 752 (2001) (“In the hierarchy of torts, emotional and relational harms are not as fully 
protected as physical injury and property damage.”); Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 28, at 
1672 (“The law in this area can do no better than announce restrictions on liability whose 
only justification is:  ‘We can’t do any better than this.’”). 
 32. Neuroscience has begun to show that emotional harm can be physically and 
objectively verified. See infra Part III.A. 
 33. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 579 (1993). 
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I.   A BRIEF BUT COMPLICATED HISTORY OF EMOTIONAL HARM CLAIMS 
The story of the development of the common law claim for emotional 
distress resulting from negligent behavior has been told many times, with 
various explanations for why the tort has never achieved the same status as 
physical or property harms in American tort law.  The claim started with a 
presumption of no duty and gradually evolved into a subset of negligence 
law that allows some sharply circumscribed recovery in certain limited 
situations, creating a patchwork of seemingly inconsistent liability rules. 
This patchwork of rules developed in part because of the different 
avenues along which emotional harm traveled in American jurisprudence.  
Emotional harm has long-standing recognition as a compensable injury as a 
parasitic harm to personal injury or property damage claims, usually 
referred to as a claim for pain and suffering.34  Common law also 
traditionally recognized emotional harm claims as a component of 
trespassory torts like assault, false imprisonment, and defamation, allowing 
a presumption of damages without a showing of related physical injury.35  
If emotional harm is proven in these cases, damages are recoverable as 
attached to some other tort, not as a stand-alone claim of emotional distress. 
The stand-alone or “pure” claim of emotional distress developed 
separately, along two tracks—one for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress (IIED) and the other, a later outgrowth of IIED, of emotional 
distress resulting from negligent behavior (NIED).  These stand-alone 
claims do not require that the plaintiff show that the defendant committed a 
separate tort or inflicted physical harm.  Instead, the claim exists on its 
own.36 
To satisfy the scienter requirement for IIED, the plaintiff must show that 
the conduct involved was extreme and outrageous, as well as demonstrate 
that the actor purposefully caused the severe emotional harm.37  The 
Restatement (Third) defines the extreme and outrageous requirement as 
“conduct [that] goes beyond the bounds of human decency such that it 
 
 34. See Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries:  A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. L. 
REV. 772, 814 (1985) (“Initially, most jurisdictions required a concurrent physical injury or 
condition.”). 
 35. See Willard H. Pedrick, Intentional Infliction:  Should Section 46 Be Revised?, 13 
PEPP. L. REV. 1, 13 (1985); see also Vitale v. Henchey, 24 S.W.3d 651, 659 (Ky. 2000) 
(noting “showing of actual damages is not an element of battery” (citation omitted)). 
 36. See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 914 (Cal. 1968).  As the Restatement (Third) 
explains with regard to IIED, “the outrage tort [IIED] originated as a catchall to permit 
recovery in the narrow instance when an actor’s conduct exceeded all permissible bounds of 
a civilized society but an existing tort claim was unavailable.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 cmt. a (2012). 
 37. RESTATEMENT  (THIRD) OF TORTS:   LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 46.  The American Law Institute recognized an independent tort of intentional infliction of 
mental distress in the Restatement of Torts in 1948. See generally David Crump, Evaluating 
Independent Torts Based upon “Intentional” or “Negligent” Infliction of Emotional 
Distress:  How Can We Keep the Baby from Dissolving in the Bath Water?, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 
439 (1992) (describing the history of IIED). 
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would be regarded as intolerable in a civilized community.”38  The focus is 
on the extreme conduct, and courts largely presume that emotional harm 
will follow.39  As a result, the plaintiff is generally not required to use 
medical testimony to show either the severity of the distress or its cause.40 
Although the claim of NIED, the second type of stand-alone emotional 
harm claim, developed as an outgrowth of IIED, it focuses squarely on the 
harm suffered rather than the extremity of the defendant’s conduct.41  
Courts moved cautiously in the development of the stand-alone claim of 
NIED, creating exceptions to the general rule of no duty through a series of 
small steps, including:  (1) dropping the requirement of a preceding 
physical injury in favor of a requirement of “physical impact;”42 
(2) expanding beyond the “impact” test to allow claims arising within a 
“zone of danger,” where the defendant’s negligence placed the plaintiff in 
danger of physical harm;43 (3) requiring physical manifestations of 
objective symptoms;44 (4) demanding a showing of a “serious” injury45 or a 
medically diagnosable one;46 and (5) imposing some combination of these 
requirements.47  Although these requirements have been criticized as 
 
 38. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 46 cmt. d. 
 39. See State Rubbish Collectors Ass’n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282, 286 (Cal. 1952) 
(“Greater proof that mental suffering occurred is found in the defendant’s conduct designed 
to bring it about than in physical injury that may or may not have resulted therefrom.”); 
Kenneth B. Baren, Bystander Emotional Distress:  Should Third Parties Recover Regardless 
of the Negligent Tort?, 25 J. LEGAL MED. 351, 353 (2004) (noting that the focus in IIED 
claims traditionally is on the outrageousness of the defendant’s conduct, not the physical 
impact or physical manifestation of the claim); Diamond, supra note 29, at 143; Rhee, supra 
note 27, at 864 (explaining that in IIED, “culpability is the prime focus”).  But see Rogers v. 
Louisville Land Co., 367 S.W.3d 196, 209–10 (Tenn. 2012) (requiring severity showing for 
both IIED and NIED claims). 
 40. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 303 (2000). 
 41. See Rhee, supra note 27, at 864–65. 
 42. Some states retain the impact requirement. See, e.g., Lee v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 
533 S.E.2d 82 (Ga. 2000); Atl. Coast Airlines v. Cook, 857 N.E.2d 989 (Ind. 2006); Steel 
Tech. v. Congleton, 234 S.W.3d 920 (Ky. 2007). 
 43. See, e.g., AALAR, Ltd. v. Francis, 716 So. 2d 1141 (Ala. 1998).  The “zone of 
danger” rule later gave rise to the “bystander” rule, under which a bystander can recover for 
emotional harm for contemporaneously witnessing bodily harm to a close relative. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 48 cmt. a. 
 44. Some states retain this requirement as well. See Brueckner v. Norwich Univ., 730 
A.2d 1086 (Vt. 1999).  However, other states have abolished this requirement. See, e.g., 
Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980).  Still, others have diluted it. See, 
e.g., Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., 949 So. 2d 1 (Miss. 2007) (requiring medically 
diagnosable disorder). 
 45. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM, 
§ 47 cmt. d. 
 46. See Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., 395 S.E.2d 85, 97 (N.C. 
1990). 
 47. See, e.g., Willis v. Gami Golden Glades, LLC, 967 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 2007) (holding 
that the plaintiff may show either impact or physical manifestation of emotional harm); see 
also Fox & Stein, supra note 19 (describing the ways these “verification requirement[s]” 
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction); Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 28, at 1633 (“courts 
employ, or have employed, a tangled array of concepts such as ‘predicate injury,’ ‘parasitic 
damage,’ ‘impact,’ ‘zone of danger,’ ‘foreseeability,’ ‘direct/indirect,’ and ‘bystander.’”). 
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arbitrary,48 the broader foreseeability of harm test, the traditional basis for 
negligence, has not been accepted as basis for liability except by a few 
jurisdictions.49  Instead, the no duty or limited duty rules are designed to 
preclude a case-by-case analysis.50  If a claimant can get beyond the duty 
barriers, courts generally apply an objective test for proof of harm—that a 
reasonable person would suffer severe emotional harm under the 
circumstances, as well as a subjective test, that the plaintiff in fact suffered 
severe emotional harm.51 
The development of the NIED claim is confusing and perhaps illogical,52 
but the claim continues to evolve and change, with limited modifications of 
the barriers.53  The most recent section of the Restatement (Third) 
addressing NIED claims,54 which states have begun to adopt,55 currently 
 
 48. See, e.g., Peter A. Bell, The Bell Tolls:  Toward Full Tort Recovery for Psychic 
Injury, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 333, 399 (1984) (arguing that mental injuries should be treated the 
same as physical injuries in tort); Elizabeth Handsley, Mental Injury Occasioned by Harm to 
Another:  A Feminist Critique, 14 LAW & INEQ. 391, 486–87 (1996) (arguing that NIED 
discriminates against women and should be treated the same as general tort law); Richard S. 
Miller, The Scope of Liability for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress:  Making “The 
Punishment Fit the Crime,” 1 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 47 (1979) (suggesting duty should be 
owed to all foreseeable plaintiffs, but damages should be limited to economic loss); Rhee, 
supra note 27, at 883 (stating current NIED doctrine is inherently arbitrary and proposing a 
complete overhaul of the law). 
 49. See, e.g., Montinieri v. S. New Eng. Tel. Co., 398 A.2d 1180, 1184 (Conn. 1978) 
(upholding jury charge based on foreseeability of the emotional distress resulting in bodily 
harm); Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758, 762–64 (Haw. 1974) (striking down requirements 
of physical impact and physical manifestation as “artificial bars” to recovery; shifting to 
general foreseeability test for bystander NIED); Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 
1970) (striking down physical manifestation requirement for NIED); Gammon v. 
Osteopathic Hosp. of Me., Inc., 534 A.2d 1282, 1285 (Me. 1987) (allowing jury to determine 
validity of the claim despite the plaintiff showing no physical manifestations of emotional 
injury, suffering no physical impact, and in the absence of any underlying or accompanying 
tort). 
 50. See Rhee, supra note 27, at 809. 
 51. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:   LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 47 cmt. l (2012). 
 52. See Rhee, supra note 27, at 846 (stating that the common law barriers to the NIED 
claim can be “understood as crude attempts to force mental injury claims into the analytical 
framework of physical injury claims.”); id. at 883 (“Courts and scholars know that the 
current rules of law are arbitrary, and that is the problem.”). 
 53. Commentators and courts have suggested various ways to modify the common law 
tests to make them less arbitrary or more effectively serve the policy concern of limiting 
liability. See Miller, supra note 48, at 38–39 (arguing for capping actual damages or limiting 
recovery to economic losses); Rhee, supra note 27, at 846 (suggesting that courts could have 
imposed a higher evidentiary burden like the clear and convincing standard); Herbert 
Winston Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease:  Legal Liability for Psychic 
Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REV. 193, 285 (1944) (advocating for the categorical rejection of all 
emotional injury claims). 
 54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 47. 
 55. See, e.g., Vumbaca v. Terminal One Grp. Ass’n L.P., 859 F. Supp. 2d 343, 373 
(E.D.N.Y. 2012) (barring recovery where emotional injury is not “serious” or suffered under 
“severe” circumstances, in a suit against an airliner for being locked in a grounded plane for 
seven hours); Cohen v. NuVasive, Inc., 164 Cal. App. 4th 868 n.15 (2008) (permitting 
recovery where the defendant mishandled human remains); Hedgepeth v. Whitman Walker 
Clinic, 22 A.3d 789, 800 (D.C. 2011) (permitting recovery where serious emotional harm is 
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has broken down the NIED claim into two main types.  It provides that 
“[a]n actor whose negligent conduct causes serious emotional harm to 
another” is liable if:   (a) the negligence places the plaintiff “in danger of 
immediate bodily harm and the emotional harm results from the danger;” or 
(b) the negligent conduct “occurs in the course of specified categories of 
activities, undertakings, or relationships in which negligent conduct is 
especially likely to cause serious emotional harm.”56 
The first type of NIED claim traces back to the traditional requirements 
of “impact” and “zone of danger,” in which the conduct of the negligent 
actor places the plaintiff in danger of bodily harm and the plaintiff suffers 
emotional harm as a result.57 
The second type of claim, which some courts classify as an independent 
duty, involves emotional harm arising in the context of certain limited 
relationships, undertakings, or activities, drawing on the traditional line of 
cases involving hospitals and funeral homes mishandling corpses or 
negligently misinforming someone about the death of a loved one.58  More 
recently, courts have begun to use this category to award damages in cases 
involving consumption of a food that contains a repulsive foreign object,59 
cases in which a physician negligently diagnoses a patient with a serious 
disease, or cases in which a hospital misplaces a newborn.60  This category 
is narrowly cabined, in order to address the concern of indeterminate and 
 
“especially likely” in HIV-misdiagnosis suit against medical clinic, given nature of the 
defendant’s relationship with the plaintiff); Miranda v. Said, 836 N.W.2d 8, 28 (Iowa 2013) 
(permitting recovery where negligent conduct in attorney-client relationship in the 
immigration context was “especially likely to cause serious emotional harm”); Osborne v. 
Keeney, 399 S.W.3d 1, 17 (Ky. 2012) (rejecting impact test and adopting “serious” or 
“severe” emotional injury test for emotional harm when a plane crashed into the plaintiff’s 
home); Boorman v. Nev. Mem’l Cremation Soc’y, 236 P.3d 4, 8 (Nev. 2010) (holding 
claimant does “not need to observe or perceive the negligent conduct, or demonstrate any 
physical manifestation of emotional distress” in deciding certified question on negligent 
mishandling of deceased family member’s remains); Strickland v. Medlen, 397 S.W.3d 184, 
192 (Tex. 2013) (finding no recovery for negligent euthanasia of plaintiffs’ dog); Vincent v. 
DeVries, 72 A.3d 886, 897 (Vt. 2013) (holding that emotional distress damages are not 
available to client in legal malpractice suit where nature of emotional harm not sufficiently 
“serious”). 
 56. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:   LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 47.  Some examples of the kinds of activities, undertakings, or relationships that might 
give rise to liability include the mishandling of dead bodies or the erroneous delivery of the 
news that someone has died. Id. § 47 cmt. f; cf. Rhee, supra note 27, at 854 (arguing for two 
classes of victims for NIED claims, the direct victim class and the collateral victim class, 
with the direct victim class including situations where the defendant and the plaintiff have a 
preexisting relationship). 
 57. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:   LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 47 cmt. b. 
 58. Id. § 47 cmt. f. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id.; see Oswald v. LeGrand, 453 N.W.2d 634, 639 (Iowa 1990) (independent duty 
for emotional distress in context of a medical malpractice action); Johnson v. Ruark 
Obstetrics & Gynecology Assoc., 395 S.E.2d 85, 93 (N.C. 1990) (same); Fox & Stein, supra 
note 19 (manuscript at 13) (“In exceptional cases, actors assume a duty to avoid emotional 
harm when they have a special relationship with the victim,” citing medical care from 
psychiatrists and fertility clinics as examples). 
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excessive liability.61  “Typically, the undertaking or relationship is one in 
which serious emotional harm is likely or where one person is in a position 
of power or authority over the other and therefore has greater potential to 
inflict emotional harm.”62  These undertakings are likely to cause serious 
emotional distress if negligently performed.63  Courts have not provided 
clear guidelines on how to identify which activities, undertakings, or 
relationships give rise to this duty,64 although several commentators have 
offered ways to define such a duty.65 
Outside of these two areas, the Restatement (Third) does not encourage 
actions for NIED.  In particular, the Restatement (Third) discourages 
actions for fear of future injury arising from toxic exposure.66  The 
cancerphobia cases present a concern of multiple lawsuits—one brought at 
exposure and the other brought when bodily injury occurs.67  It 
distinguishes cancerphobia cases from the HIV exposure cases, however, 
because the HIV exposure cases have a relatively confined period during 
which the exposed individual would suffer from emotional harm and is 
more akin to automobile accidents.68  Several commentators find this 
distinction ironic because the cancerphobia claim is arguably the more 
significant one.69 
While the NIED claim for direct victims developed, courts also gradually 
began to allow a bystander who witnessed an accident and suffered 
 
 61. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 47 cmt. d. 
 62. Id. § 47 cmt. f. 
 63. See generally Hedgepeth v. Whitman Walker Clinic, 22 A.3d 789 (D.C. 2011) 
(citing cases from various jurisdictions).  Some courts have rejected this idea, however. See, 
e.g., Spangler v. Bechtel, 958 N.E.2d 458, 464 (Ind. 2011) (stating that to recover under a 
NIED claim, the plaintiff must either suffer an impact or satisfy the bystander rules). 
 64. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:   LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 47 cmt. f. 
 65. See generally Dan B. Dobbs, Undertakings and Special Relationships in Claims for 
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 49 (2008) (arguing that the 
independent duty should be commensurate to the extent of the undertaking); Jeffrey A. 
Ehrich, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress:  A Case for an Independent Duty Rule in 
Minnesota, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1402 (2011) (proposing an independent duty rule 
examining factors such as historical industry acceptance of a duty, the subject matter of the 
harm involved, and countervailing policy considerations). 
 66. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 47 cmt. k. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. (explaining that in HIV exposure cases, a “person can determine within a known 
and relatively short interval whether or not the exposure actually did cause the physical 
injury,” like an automobile accident). 
 69. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 29, at 164 (explaining that the anomaly of 
compensating for lesser but not greater injuries can be explained by the concern that 
“compensating for short-term distress is not economically burdensome while compensating 
for long-term distress would be”); Robert L. Rabin, Harms from Exposure to Toxic 
Substances:  The Limits of Liability Law, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 419, 425 (2011) (“[R]espectable 
argument can be made that it is perverse to recognize the tort claim of an individual 
traumatized by almost being hit by a negligent driver (a fleeting moment of terror?), but to 
deny recovery to an individual living with a long-term prospect of contracting cancer due to 
a defendant’s wrongful conduct.”). 
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emotional harm as a result to recover in certain limited settings.  
“Bystander” NIED cases also developed a series of limited duty barriers.  
Dillon v. Legg70 became the leading case recognizing bystander liability, 
articulating certain factors required before recovery could go forward.71  
The Restatement (Third) has adopted a version of the Dillon rule, requiring 
the bystander to contemporaneously observe sudden serious bodily harm to 
a close family member before being allowed to recover for emotional 
harm.72 
This brief chronicle omits a great deal of historical description.  
However, the main point is that the courts began with the general rule that 
an actor is not liable for negligent conduct that causes only emotional harm.  
Then, as they began to recognize exceptions to the general rule in certain 
limited settings, courts set up a series of barriers to the stand-alone claim of 
emotional injury on an ad hoc basis.  Courts generally recited a number of 
concerns—based on proof problems and the widespread nature of the 
injury—to justify the barriers. 
This type of claim screening through limited duty rules may not 
sufficiently take into account modern developments in the understanding, 
diagnosis, and verification of mental illness.  In particular, as we gain 
greater ability to empirically measure emotional harm claims, we should 
shift to using traditional evidentiary screening for fact-based validity 
evidence rather than relying on special pleading rules and limited duty 
barriers, allowing the fact-finder to decide the question.  Separating out our 
validity concerns will force us to judge whether limiting tests are justified 
for other reasons, theoretical or policy-based, which require us to go back to 
first principles. 
II.   THE UNDERLYING THEORIES OF TORT LAW IN NIED 
This part examines the theories behind negligence-based torts, and NIED 
claims in particular, to explore whether we can carve out verification 
questions in NIED claims from other substantive concerns.  Separating 
these concerns would allow the traditional fact-finder to determine factual 
validity questions—subject to traditional evidentiary limitations—instead of 
having the judge make factual findings on validity in the context of 
applying limited duty rules. 
 
 70. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968). 
 71. The court named three factors to be used in determining the degree of foreseeability:  
(1) the plaintiff’s proximity to the accident; (2) whether the plaintiff directly observed the 
accident; and (3) whether the plaintiff had a close relationship with the victim. Id. at 920.  
Before Dillon, courts allowed recovery for witnessing bodily harm to another only if the 
person was subjected to physical impact from the defendant’s negligent conduct or was 
personally in the “zone of danger” from the defendant’s negligent conduct. RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 48 cmt. a. 
 72. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:   LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 48.  This claim is considered derivative of the physically injured person’s tort claim against 
the tortfeasor, so that the plaintiff must prove that the physically injured person could 
recover from the tortfeasor. Id. § 48 cmt. d. 
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Identifying the rationale behind tort law is a complex enterprise.  Two 
main theories have dominated the jurisprudence over the last several 
decades:  a rights-based theory and an instrumentalist theory.73  Some 
scholars argue that tort law is rights-based—that is, that torts should 
redress, or provide recourse for, wrongs.  This approach looks backward to 
the relationship between the victim and the injurer.  Other scholars see torts 
as more instrumental—that is, torts should be used to prevent wrongs or 
shift injury costs away from those who have suffered loss.  This approach 
looks beyond the relationship between the injurer and the victim to examine 
the effect that imposing liability will have on others.74  These two views 
have offered a unified, or monist, theory of how tort cases have been 
decided historically.75  Yet, many scholars of tort law find monist theories 
to be overly restrictive and incomplete, embracing instead a more pluralistic 
conception of tort law.76 
In examining these main theories, we must begin with the two major 
functions of tort law that are generally accepted:  corrective justice and 
deterrence.77  A rights-based theory of tort law draws from the first major 
function, corrective justice.  It calls on tort law to distribute responsibility 
according to the injustice that results from the tortfeasor’s conduct and 
serves to correct the moral imbalance that results when one party wrongs 
 
 73. See John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages:  Fair v. Full 
Compensation, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 468 (2006) (“[S]ince the 1970s it has been standard 
in academic discussions of tort . . . to divide the world of tort theory into justice-based 
theories on the one hand and welfarist or utilitarian theories on the other.”). 
 74. See W. Jonathan Cardi, A Pluralistic Analysis of the Therapist/Physician Duty to 
Warn Third Parties, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 877, 887 (2009) (“[I]nstrumentalist theories 
view tort law as the state’s means of achieving certain goals external to the dispute between 
the parties—the dominant theory being economic instrumentalism with the goal of reducing 
injuries to their most efficient level.”). 
 75. See id. 
 76. See Larry Alexander & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Confused Culpability, Contrived 
Causation and the Collapse of Tort Theory, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF 
TORTS 406 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014) (noting that tort law consists of a “motley collection of 
doctrines” that are difficult to justify under normative principles); Jason M. Solomon, Equal 
Accountability Through Tort Law, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1765, 1772 (2009) (describing how 
many scholars fall back to pluralistic account of tort law). 
 77. Numerous other functions of tort law are also used to justify tort liability, in 
particular the functions of loss distribution and compensation. See Guido Calabresi, Some 
Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 505 (1961).  The loss 
distribution view recognizes that defendants frequently do not shoulder the burden of 
compensation themselves, but rather pass it on to a larger number of individuals. Id.  Loss 
distribution is used to justify rules of liability that impose liability on businesses and 
institutions that can redistribute their losses to insurance or customers. Id.  Although some 
authors suggest that compensation is a goal of tort law, others characterize it more as an 
effect of imposing tort liability.  Under this view, awarding compensation is a way to serve 
other goals of tort law, like deterrence and corrective justice.  In other words, compensation 
is not awarded simply because an individual suffered injuries resulting from a defendant’s 
activity; other factors explain the imposition of liability and consequent requirement of 
payment of monetary damages. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 91 
(1963) (“The undertaking to redistribute losses simply on the ground that they resulted from 
the defendant’s act would not only be open to [other] objections but . . . to the still graver 
one of offending the sense of justice.”). 
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another.78  “[C]orrective justice narrowly focuses on the question of what is 
just between the parties, rather than on the implications that a decision in 
one case might have for society as a whole . . . .”79 
Some scholars from the rights-based school focus less on ensuring that an 
injustice is corrected and more on providing victims with recourse for civil 
wrongs.80  This civil recourse approach views as paramount the victims’ 
need for recognition that they have been wronged.81  Under this view, 
payment of damages should be proportional to the seriousness of the injury 
and the seriousness of the wrong.  The civil recourse view does not deny 
that emotional distress is a harm or view it as a less serious form of harm 
than physical injury; instead it “assert[s] that actors are not ordinarily under 
a legal duty to be vigilant of others’ emotional well-being.”82 
The second generally accepted major function of tort law, deterrence, 
draws from instrumentalist concerns and tries to prevent future injurious 
behavior by threatening liability for tortious actions.83  This view looks 
beyond the relationship between the injurer and the victim to reducing the 
overall social consequences of risky activity.84  Some risks (and the 
consequent losses that may ensue) are not worth avoiding from a societal 
perspective.  For example, there are social benefits to having people drive, 
even though driving is a risky activity; we seek to promote optimal 
deterrence by deterring unnecessarily risky driving. 
In seeking optimal deterrence, some supporters of the theory use an 
economic lens to determine quantitatively which risks are worth deterring 
and which are not.  They compare the monetary costs of risking certain 
losses with the monetary costs of preventing those losses.  “[T]his idea 
emphasizes the impact of legal rules on incentives, and in injury law it often 
utilizes a comparison of costs and benefits.”85  This strict economic 
 
 78. See generally ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995) (elucidating 
account of corrective justice as unifying structure in tort law); Cardi, supra note 74, at 887 
(“Corrective justice generally posits that the tort system is exclusively about establishing 
justice through examining the relationship between the parties to the action, balancing their 
respective rights and obligations under the circumstances, and resolving their individualized 
dispute justly.”); Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 
IND. L.J. 349, 353 (1992) (explaining that losses can be wrongful if they invade a legally 
protected right); John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 570 
(2003) (“Tort law, on this view, aims both to specify the primary duties actors owe to one 
another and to provide a vehicle by which the secondary duty to repair is enforced.”). 
 79. MARSHALL S. SHAPO, AN INJURY LAW CONSTITUTION 217 (2012) (tracing the 
corrective justice approach from the writings of Aristotle). 
 80. See, e.g., Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. 
L.J. 695 (2003). 
 81. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 28, at 1672–73 (“[T]he right question to ask is:  
‘Has the plaintiff been wronged such that she is now entitled to seek recourse?’”). 
 82. Id. at 1673. 
 83. See Andrew F. Popper, In Defense of Deterrence, 75 ALB. L. REV. 181, 181 (2012) 
(“The civil justice system deters misconduct.”). 
 84. Id. (“Civil judgments, settlements, the potential for litigation—the tort system 
itself—has a beneficial effect on the behavior of those who are the subject of legal action as 
well as others in the same or similar lines of commerce.”). 
 85. SHAPO, supra note 79, at 229 (noting that this analysis often focuses on the “least 
cost avoider,” or the party that can most cheaply avoid an injury). 
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approach is sometimes criticized for ignoring other social costs, including 
important human values that may not have a monetary value attached to 
them.86 
The jurisprudence of the NIED tort represents a mixture of corrective 
justice and instrumentalist reasoning, with a heavier emphasis on the latter.  
Although courts frequently focus on the relationship between the parties 
and draw upon community notions of harm, both critical to the theory of 
corrective justice, many theorists and courts emphasize the instrumentalist 
concerns, looking to factors such as overdeterrence in justifying limits on 
the NIED tort.  Moreover, despite the courts’ recitation of these factors, 
they sometimes muddy the concerns and seem to be relying on mere 
intuition.87  A more thorough examination reveals the need for a clearer, if 
theoretically pluralistic, understanding of duty in this context. 
A.   Corrective Justice Concerns 
Rights-based theories of tort law recognize that victims have certain 
rights that, when violated, demand compensation from the injurer.  The 
nature and extent of a victim’s harm is determined by looking to the 
victim’s rights and evaluating the relationship between the victim and the 
injurer to determine if the victim’s rights were violated under the 
circumstances. 
There are numerous ways to conceptualize a victim’s rights under 
corrective justice theory.88  Under basic principles of corrective justice, as 
outlined by Aristotle, the right to equality is the governing factor.89  The 
right to self-preservation is another right that is recognized, and can be 
conceptualized as deriving from a fundamental right to exist free of harm 
from wrongful conduct.90  It also has been explained in terms of Locke’s 
 
 86. See Michael D. Green, Negligence=Economic Efficiency:  Doubts, 75 TEX. L. REV. 
1605, 1640 (1997) (“How much is a broken arm, a shattered brain, or a life 
worth? . . . [M]ost people react to comparisons of lives and limbs with the dollars it would 
cost to save them as jarring, inappropriate, or even absurd.”). 
 87. See Erica Goldberg, Emotional Duties, 47 CONN. L. REV. 809, 817 (2015) (finding 
emotional harm cases in tort law “have generated doctrine that perhaps embodies our 
intuitions”). 
 88. See Zipursky, supra note 80, at 700 n.18 (listing various schools of corrective 
justice). 
 89. Alan Calnan, The Instrumental Justice of Private Law, 78 UMKC L. REV. 559, 579 
(2010) (“Justice’s private dimension, which addresses the unique dynamics of interpersonal 
transactions, is embodied in the Aristotelian notion of corrective justice.  Corrective justice 
seeks to restore moral equilibrium to human relations that become imbalanced by wrongful 
conduct . . . by forcing the wrongdoer to disgorge her gain and extinguish the victim’s 
loss.”).  In order to determine the proper remedy, a neutral party (the judge) first determines 
the position of equality of the parties before the injury occurred.  Next, the judge determines 
if the injury caused any unjust gain or loss.  Finally, to restore the parties to a position of 
equality, any unjust gain is returned to the victim, and any unjust loss is compensated. Id.; 
see Mark C. Modak-Truran, Corrective Justice and the Revival of Judicial Virtue, 12 YALE 
J.L. & HUMAN. 249, 257–59 (2000). 
 90. See Rhee, supra note 27, at 855–57 (2004). 
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social contract theory.91  Still another rights-based theory sees a victim’s 
right as a right to a remedy.92 
John Rawls’s theory of social justice offers another way to conceptualize 
victim’s rights.93  Under this theory, every person is entitled to justice as 
fairness, or, put differently, every individual should be given an equal 
ability to pursue his or her conception of what is good.94  Since physical 
and mental well-being are necessary to participate completely in and enjoy 
the human experience, any trespass that causes physical or mental harm 
interferes with the victim’s right to equal opportunities in life.95 
Under all of these interpretations of rights-based theory, a victim should 
be able to recover for injuries of any sort, both physical and emotional, if 
the victim’s right has been violated.96  But, this is not the case.  Tort law 
has traditionally deemphasized rights-based concerns in the NIED context.  
One reason is because courts believe they are limited in being able to 
recognize or quantify effectively emotional harm, and therefore they are 
less willing to emphasize corrective justice concerns.  They are less certain 
that the claims have merit.97 
Consequently, courts measure the values of corrective justice differently 
in the NIED context than in other tort contexts.  Although all line drawing 
 
 91. See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law:  Due Process and 
the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 542–44 (2005).  In 
Locke’s state of nature, each individual possessed the right to self-preservation, along with 
the right to redress injuries caused by the trespass of others.  The right to redress injuries 
encompassed both an individual right to reparation and a more general right to punish 
trespass on behalf of all society.  Once the social contract was formed, government was 
granted the right to punish trespass or refuse remedy for trespass against the whole society.  
However, each member of society retained the individual right to reparation for trespasses 
against them.  Thus, under this theory, a victim is entitled to seek compensation for any 
trespass that threatens his or her right to self-preservation. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND 
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 11 (1690). 
 92. See generally Eric Encarnacion, Corrective Justice As Making Amends, 62 BUFF. L. 
REV. 451 (2014).  Under this view, the wrongdoer has a duty to make amends to the victim, 
but it does not equate to the traditional duty to make restitution or make the victim whole. 
See W. Jonathan Cardi, Damages As Reconciliation, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 5, 18 (2008) 
(“[C]ourts can and should embrace reconciliation as one of the law’s central goals in 
litigation, particularly in tort cases.”).  Instead, the wrongdoer is only required to make 
reasonable, adequate conciliatory gestures. Id. at 15 (“[O]ffering of reparations by the 
wrongdoer is a strong sign that apology, remorse, and the desire to reconcile are real and not 
manufactured.  Without assurances that the offender is genuine, few victims are willing to 
walk the path of reconciliation.”). 
 93. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999). 
 94. Id. at 10–11. 
 95. See Bell, supra note 48, at 342 (stating that under this view, “[p]sychic well-being is 
the core of what is important to human existence and is too important to the individual to 
surrender”). 
 96. See Gregory C. Keating, When Is Emotional Distress Harm?, in TORT LAW:  
CHALLENGING ORTHODOXY 273, 305 (Stephen G.K. Pitel et al. eds., 2013) (“[P]sychological 
integrity is as essential to effective agency as physical integrity is.”); Rhee, supra note 27, at 
852 (“Ideally, every person should have a right to be free from the imposition of wrongful 
conduct that would cause injuries.”). 
 97. See Adam J. Kolber, The Experiential Future of the Law, 60 EMORY L.J. 585, 622 
(2011) (noting that limited duty tests stood as “inaccurate proxies for the measurement of the 
intensity of a plaintiff’s emotional distress”). 
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used in common law torts reflects the inherent tension between exercising 
the freedom to act and the need to conform to societal constraints, in the 
emotional harm area, courts rely more heavily on the degree of culpability 
involved; the more egregious the behavior, the more likely the harm will be 
recognized.  For example, as described above, the initial recognition of a 
claim for recovery of emotional injury grew out of the intentional tort 
context.  This tort does not require a specific showing of harm; injury is 
presumed.  It appears that the paramount value promoted by IIED is the 
interest in regulating conduct, with a lesser concern about the actual injury 
suffered or the need to provide compensation.98  In other words, the social 
interest in ensuring conformity is stronger than the individual interest in 
receiving recognition for a wrong suffered.99 
The balance struck between these values shifted as recognition of the tort 
expanded from the intentional to the negligence area.  As the degree of 
culpability shifted down, moving from intentional, to gross, and finally to 
negligent behavior, so did the social interest in regulating behavior.  But the 
interest in recognizing a harm suffered did not grow commensurately; the 
value of freedom of action takes on greater significance under this view.100  
This approach helps keep NIED claims to a minimum and allows courts to 
reserve valuable and limited resources for less speculative (and more 
important) physical harm claims.  
Only the historical exceptions, in which courts did not require a showing 
of injury in certain specific contexts (the negligent handling of a corpse and 
the negligently delivered death announcement), shifted the emphasis to 
more corrective justice concerns.  This may reflect a consensus about the 
likely validity of the harm and strong public interest in protecting the 
sanctity of death, including burial and misinformation regarding death, or it 
may reflect a consensus about the nature of certain relationships in which 
one party requires extra protection.101 
B.   Instrumentalist Concerns 
Instrumentalist concerns dominate the NIED field.  As described above, 
courts historically expressed general disapproval of emotional harm as a 
compensable injury, originally finding no duty and then gradually setting up 
 
 98. See Brian L. Church, Balancing Corrective Justice and Deterrence:  Injury 
Requirements and the Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, 60 ALA. L. REV. 697, 704 
(2009). 
 99. See Crump, supra note 37, at 448–49.  That is not to say, however, that all 
intentional conduct that causes emotional harm has little social value. Id. (citing examples 
like a “fire-and-brimstone preacher” and a lawyer cross-examining a witness to suggest 
instances of socially desirable activities that inflict emotional distress). 
 100. This general view also creates more subtle value-laden judgments that have a 
disparate impact on certain classes of claimants. See Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, 
Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright:  A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814, 816 (1990) 
(claims by women); Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 28, at 1669; Rhee, supra note 27, at 
844 (same-sex marriage). 
 101. At least one author has categorized these actions as intentional torts. John J. Kircher, 
The Four Faces of Tort Law:   Liability for Emotional Harm, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 789, 796 
(2007). 
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a series of unique limiting tests in the form of special pleading 
requirements.102  Various explanations that reflect instrumentalist concerns 
are offered for this disparate treatment.  However, at bottom, the 
instrumental concern of optimal deterrence is calculated differently than for 
other negligence claims.  The underlying message behind the limitations is 
that these claims are of lesser importance in the tort system than personal 
injury or property harms.103  Undervaluing loss from emotional harm 
lowers the value of deterrence in this area. 
This concern is often expressed as a fear of opening up the proverbial 
floodgates of litigation. Initially, this concern served as an absolute barrier 
to the claim.104  Small inroads were made in certain limited situations—the 
mishandling of a corpse and the erroneous announcement of a death of a 
family member105—special recognition that exists to this day.106  From an 
instrumentalist standpoint, these exceptions may reflect the assurance of 
both the genuineness as well as the infrequency of the claim.107 
Other inroads occurred that were fashioned to meet instrumentalist 
concerns of uncontrolled liability exposure.  Imposing the spatial restriction 
to victims of emotional distress within the “zone of danger” of serious 
physical injury reflects the same commitment to avoid opening of the 
floodgates of litigation.  This means that victims of “near-misses” of airline 
or car crashes are eligible to recover for emotional distress108 but that 
“cancerphobia” cases may not afford the opportunity for recovery for 
emotional distress.  In the latter cases, in which an individual has been 
exposed to some toxins that may have long-term health consequences, the 
zone of danger requirement has been retained as a barrier to NIED 
claims.109 
Cancerphobia cases also demonstrate a related instrumentalist concern 
involving the need to prioritize claims to avoid depletion of a defendant’s 
resources that other (“more deserving”) claimants may later pursue.  This 
view has been highlighted in the asbestos litigation.  As the Supreme Court 
 
 102. See supra notes 40–48 and accompanying text. 
 103. See Mark Geistfeld, The Analytics of Duty:   Medical Monitoring and Related Forms 
of Economic Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1921, 1935 (2002) (explaining the need for prioritization; 
if a more expansive duty for emotional harm would significantly decrease the possibility for 
full compensation for physically injured claimants, then emotional harm duty must be 
limited); Goldberg, supra note 87, at 825 n.78 (listing scholars who question tort law’s lesser 
protection afforded emotional harm over physical injury). 
 104. See Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 45 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1896), overruled by Battalla v. 
State, 176 N.E.2d 729 (N.Y. 1961). 
 105. See Robert L. Rabin, Emotional Distress in Tort Law:  Themes of Constraint, 44 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1197, 1199 (2009). 
 106. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 47 (2012); 
DOBBS, supra note 40, § 308, at 836–37. 
 107. See Rabin, supra note 105, at 1199. 
 108. See, e.g., Quill v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 361 N.W.2d 438 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1985) (discussing how the airplane plunged 34,000 feet before gaining control); Falzone v. 
Busch, 214 A.2d 12 (N.J. 1965) (discussing evolution of near miss doctrine); Rabin, supra 
note 105, at 1199, 1208. 
 109. See Rabin, supra note 105, at 1200. 
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wrote in Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. v. Buckley,110 “[i]n a world 
of limited resources, would a rule permitting immediate large-scale 
recoveries for widespread emotional distress caused by fear of future 
disease diminish the likelihood of recovery by those who later suffer from 
the disease?”111  When the claims of those who suffer anxiety about what 
ultimately may happen to them are pitted against those whose fears actually 
come to fruition, the courts signaled that the “more deserving” victims were 
those who suffered the most serious physical consequences.112 
Related to the need to prioritize claims is the concern of the award’s 
disproportionality to the tort involved.  Here, court decisions seek to ensure 
fairness to the injurer by invoking the principle that “the punishment should 
fit the crime.”113  Although the move from no duty to the limited duty of 
NIED suggests that courts now recognize greater social interest in 
regulating conduct that affects emotional well-being, the rules are designed 
to ensure that certain conduct affecting emotional well-being is not (over) 
deterred.  Optimal deterrence has a different equation in this context.  From 
this point of view, the concern is not the legitimacy of the claim; it’s that 
there will be too many claims.  The limiting tests are designed to ensure that 
defendants and the other entities to which they passed on costs are not 
overly burdened with NIED claims.114  Thus, the Supreme Court justified 
the line that it drew between physical and mental harms in Buckley by 
explaining that it allows a “tort system that can distinguish between reliable 
and serious claims on the one hand, and unreliable and relatively trivial 
claims on the other.”115 
As our understanding of and ability to measure empirically emotional 
harm changes, so should our emphasis on the values we promote.  The 
instrumentalist perspective is motivated partly by a set of concerns that 
advances in neuroscience can allay.  We may not need to prioritize physical 
damage claims over emotional harm claims, as we learn that emotional 
harm has a physical correlate.  As the sharp distinction between the two can 
 
 110. 521 U.S. 424 (1997) (examining NIED claims under the Federal Employers’ 
Liability Act for exposure to asbestos without symptoms). 
 111. Id. at 435–36. 
 112. Rabin, supra note 105, at 1200; see also Peter H. Schuck, The Worst Should Go 
First:  Deferral Registries in Asbestos Litigation, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 541, 560–62 
(1992).  The asbestos litigation has also developed an intermediate situation in which the 
claimant suffers some intermediate injury, like asbestosis, which may develop into a life-
threatening disease.  The Supreme Court recognized that this situation may warrant recovery 
since the claim is now more “genuine and serious” emotional distress. See Norfolk & W. Ry. 
Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 156–57 (2003); Rabin, supra note 105, at 1201.  The lower 
courts remain divided on the duty to compensate for emotional distress in the “precursor-
disease” context. See Rabin, supra note 105, at 1201–02. 
 113. See Rabin, supra note 69, at 425–26 (“The diversity of treatment of NIED claims has 
floodgates written all over it.”). 
 114. See id. at 430.  As Professor Rabin states:  “Boundless litigation is, from the judicial 
perspective, an attack on the very foundations of tort law:   from a judicial administration 
vantage point, the capacity to process cases efficiently, and from the parties’ vantage point, a 
recognition of claims to ‘just deserts’ in the face of prospectively insolvent responsible 
parties.” Id. 
 115. Metro-N. Commuter R.R. Co., 521 U.S. at 444. 
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no longer be maintained, the case for differential promotion in values falls 
away as well.  Instead, the presumption should be that we strike the same 
balance between individual and social interests for NIED claims as for other 
negligence claims and, as we restore this balance, the burden should shift to 
those who would argue otherwise.  In other words, as we learn more about 
the validity of emotional harm, we should promote more prominently the 
value of corrective justice and recognition of victims’ rights.  The next part 
explores developments in science and medicine and how they have begun to 
change our normative view of emotional harm as well. 
III.   DEFINING THE HARM:   SCIENCE, MEDICINE, AND COMMON SENSE 
Common law courts have struggled with the legal definition of emotional 
harm in their quest to distinguish worthy from unworthy NIED claims.  
Defining what it means to be harmed emotionally depends critically on the 
framework used to examine the question—whether from a scientific, 
medical, or normative perspective.  These three viewpoints influence each 
other and offer different, but overlapping, ways to define emotional harm.  
Legal definitions frequently reflect an attempt to create an amalgam of all 
of these perspectives, while trying to address different theoretical and 
policy concerns. 
When courts began to recognize the tort of NIED, a major definitional 
concern was addressing the subjectivity associated with the harm and the 
potential for fraud.  Courts distinguished emotional from physical harm 
because it is a mental state not directly observable by others that is highly 
subjective, based mostly on self-reporting.  This could lead, in turn, to the 
ability by plaintiffs to feign emotional injuries to get compensation, leading 
to excessive and fictitious lawsuits.116 
Although courts continue to maintain the distinction between recognition 
of physical harm and emotional harm, there has been a movement in 
science and medicine away from a strong distinction between those harms.  
Both scientists and scholars have moved away from explanations that treat 
“mental” and “physical” as separate categories.  Neuroscientists have begun 
to develop new models of looking at the interaction between mind and 
 
 116. Many of the same problems, such as subjectivity, measurement uncertainty, and 
potential for fraud, exist with pain and suffering associated with physical injuries.  These 
parasitic damages have not concerned courts in the same way, perhaps because courts are 
willing to say it is easier to believe that pain and mental suffering occurs following a 
physical injury.  See Goldberg, supra note 87, at 823 n.68 (“[P]arasitic damages ‘avoid[] the 
trivial or fraudulent claims that have been thought to be inevitable due to the subjective 
nature of [emotional] injuries.’” (quoting Flax v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 272 S.W.3d 521, 
527 (Tenn. 2008))).  This only gets the plaintiff over the threshold, however.  The level of 
pain and suffering that a plaintiff experiences presents the same difficulties as in the NIED 
context, and yet courts allow the pain and suffering elements in the conventional tort injury 
cases full consideration by jurors.  Perhaps the difference is that the tort system is not really 
addressing compensation for the mental element, but allowing an offset for the legal fees that 
cut into the special damages and restoring full compensation for the physical injuries. But 
see Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 28, at 1673–74 (theorizing that emotional tranquility 
on its own, except rarely, is insufficient to impose duty on defendants to protect others’ 
emotional well-being). 
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body.117  Scholars have begun to integrate this in their view of looking at 
legal questions.118  And even courts have begun to recognize that the 
distinction between mind and body has become blurred.119  As these 
changes occur, we will need to recognize them in the jurisprudence of 
NIED as well.  At the outset, those changes may force courts to unpack 
validity from other concerns and allow us to address the differing concerns 
through different judicial mechanisms. 
A.   Scientific Advances in Assessing the “Neural Basis of Emotion” 
Although the field is in the early stages, neuroscience advances may 
someday allow us to measure physiological changes in the brain regions 
that occur after a traumatic event.120  These advances are significant 
because they may offer a way to document physical changes that result 
from emotional harm, allowing us to verify and objectively measure a claim 
of emotional harm.  In other words, these advances suggest a potential, 
objective biomarker of emotional harm.  Through the use of neuroscience 
and neuroimaging, scientists have begun to link cognitive disorders from 
exposure to trauma to neurological conditions.121  While individual 
differences such as age, gender, and genetics may influence whether an 
individual will develop a cognitive disorder following a traumatic event, 
neuroscientists have come to understand that dysfunction occurs in the 
neural systems that regulate emotion when an individual experiences acute 
stress.122 
 
 117. See, e.g., Kolber, supra note 97. 
 118. See, e.g., ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR:  EMOTION, REASON, AND THE 
HUMAN BRAIN (1994); PETER ALCES, THE MORAL INTERSECTION OF LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 
41 (Univ. Chicago forthcoming 2017) (“Once we have a way to ‘see’ emotional injury as 
clearly as we can ‘see’ a broken bone . . . there would be no reason to maintain the tort law’s 
distinction between physical and emotional injury.”); Shaun Cassin, Eggshell Minds and 
Invisible Injuries:   Can Neuroscience Challenge Longstanding Treatment of Tort Injuries?, 
50 HOUS. L. REV. 929, 954 (2013) (“Neuroscience is making it harder to support a legal 
distinction between physical and emotional injuries.”); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. 
Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996); 
Kolber, supra note 97. 
 119. See Allen v. Bloomfield Hills Sch. Dist., 760 N.W.2d 811, 815 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2008) (ruling that PTSD suffered by the plaintiff was a bodily injury to the brain).  In the 
context of insurance policies, many courts have found emotional harm constitutes “bodily 
injury.” See Pekin Ins. Co. v. Hugh, 501 N.W.2d 508, 512 (Iowa 1993) (finding that whether 
a claimant suffered “bodily injury” involved “a medical or psychological problem of proof 
rather than purely a question of law . . . . [Compensation] should not therefore turn on any 
artificial and arbitrary classification such as ‘physical’ or ‘psychological’”); Trinh v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 37 P.3d 1259, 1264 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (concluding that defendant experienced 
physiologic/neurobiologic injuries as a direct result of her PTSD). 
 120. This section draws on my earlier work, see supra note 18, as well as others. See 
Adam J. Kolber, Will There Be a Neurolaw Revolution?, 89 IND. L.J. 807 (2014); Jean 
Macchiaroli Eggen & Eric J. Laury, Toward a Neuroscience Model of Tort Law:   How 
Functional Neuroimaging Will Transform Tort Doctrine, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 
235 (2012). 
 121. See, e.g., Amir Garakani et al., Neurobiology of Anxiety Disorders and Implications 
for Treatment, 73 MOUNT SINAI J. MED. 941 (2006). 
 122. Kevin N. Ochsner et al., Neural Correlates of Individual Differences in Pain-Related 
Fear and Anxiety, 120 PAIN 69, 69–70 (2006); Jason J. Radley et al., Stress Risk Factors and 
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Neuroscientist and Professor Joseph E. LeDoux is an early advocate of 
the view that emotions, like other physical sensations, result from 
physiological processes and therefore can be studied objectively.123  He 
explains: 
If we want to understand feelings, it is likely going to be necessary to 
figure out how the more basic systems work.  Failure to come to terms 
theoretically with the importance of processing systems that operate 
essentially unconsciously has been a major impediment to progress in 
understanding the neural basis of emotion.  To overcome this, brain 
researchers need to be more savvy about the nature of emotions, rather 
than simply relying on common sense beliefs about emotions as 
subjective feeling states.124 
Researchers are heeding LeDoux’s call to investigate the “neural basis of 
emotion.”125  In particular, an increased awareness of PTSD and trauma-
related disorders, as well as troops returning from wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan with trauma-related disorders, has led to an increase in 
research funding for PTSD since 2007.126  Resulting research has begun to 
shed light on the specific neural circuitry dedicated to emotional function.  
Evidence indicates that individuals with psychiatric disorders have 
abnormalities in these neural circuitry systems and exposure to traumatic 
events can change this circuitry in previously healthy individuals.127 
Witnessing or experiencing a traumatic event results in a state described 
as acute stress, characterized by activation of a number of hormonal and 
neurotransmitter systems.128  These systems trigger a chain of chemical 
processes that result in alterations in the neural networks that regulate 
 
Stress-Related Pathology:   Neuroplasticity, Epigenetics and Endophenotypes, 14 STRESS 
481, 481–82 (2011). 
 123. See Joseph E. LeDoux, Emotional Circuits in the Brain, 23 ANN. REV. 
NEUROSCIENCE 155, 156 (2000). 
 124. Id. at 157. 
 125. See, e.g., Lisa Feldman Barrett et al., The Experience of Emotion, 58 ANN. REV. 
PSYCHOL. 373 (2007); Naomi I. Eisenberger, Identifying the Neural Correlates Underlying 
Social Pain:  Implications for Developmental Processes, 49 HUM. DEV. 273 (2006); Ethan 
Kross et al., Coping with Emotions Past:  The Neural Bases of Regulating Affect Associated 
with Negative Autobiographical Memories, 65 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 361 (2009); 
Ochsner et al., supra note 122. 
 126. Editorial, Neuropharmacology Special Issue on Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD):  Current State of the Art in Clinical and Preclinical PTSD Research, 62 
NEUROPHARMACOLOGY 539, 539 (2012). 
 127. Adriana Feder et al., Psychobiology and Molecular Genetics of Resilience, 10 
NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 446, 451–52 (2009); Roger K. Pitman et al., Investigating the 
Pathogenesis of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder with Neuroimaging, 62 J. CLIN. PSYCHIATRY 
47, supp. 17 (2001). 
 128. Roger K. Pitman et al., Pilot Study of Secondary Prevention of Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder with Propranolol, 51 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 189, 190–92 (2002); Benno 
Roozendaal et al., Stress, Memory and the Amygdala, 10 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCe 423, 
427 (2009); Yvonne M. Ulrich-Lai & James P. Herman, Neural Regulation of Endocrine and 
Autonomic Stress Responses, 10 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 397, 404 (2009). 
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memory and fear.129  These physiological changes can materialize in the 
form of emotional distress symptoms, particularly anxiety symptoms.130 
Extensive and replicated research has revealed several brain regions that 
are associated with emotional trauma.131  Research suggests emotional 
disorders from trauma occur when this circuitry malfunctions.132  
This section proceeds in two parts:   (1) it describes briefly the processes, 
structures, and neural networks underlying memory and fear that are 
believed to be foundational to emotional harm; and (2) it highlights studies 
indicating the dysfunction that occurs when an individual experiences 
trauma and stress-related disorders, focusing in particular on the disorder of 
PTSD.133  The focus on PTSD is appropriate for several reasons.  As noted 
above, PTSD is probably the most heavily researched trauma-related 
disorder in neuroscience at this stage.  Further, PTSD is comparable to what 
we recognize as emotional harm in law, since the disorder is trauma-
induced and has a delayed manifestation of outward symptoms.  Moreover, 
development of PTSD is relatively frequent in individuals exposed to 
trauma:  researchers estimate 10 to 15 percent of individuals exposed to 
trauma will develop the disorder, and 6.8 percent of Americans will 
experience PTSD at some point in their lifetime.134 
 
 129. Pitman et al., supra note 128, at 189; Roozendaal et al., supra note 128, at 424; 
Ulrich-Lai & Herman, supra note 128, at 398. 
 130. Roozendaal et al., supra note 128, at 427. 
 131. In particular, structural and functional neuroimaging results implicate the 
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis, the locus coeruleus (LC)-noradrenergic systems, 
the amygdala, hippocampus, specific subregions of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), anterior cingulated (ACC) and insular cortices, in the processing 
and storage of stressful events and emotional information. Cora Hubner et al., Ex Vivo 
Dissection of Optogenetically Activated mPFC and Hippocampal Inputs to Neurons in the 
Basolateral Amygdala:  Implications for Fear and Emotional Memory, 8 FRONTIERS BEHAV. 
NEUROSCIENCE 1, 1–5 (2014); Martin P. Paulus, The Role of Neuroimaging for the Diagnosis 
and Treatment of Anxiety Disorders, 25 DEPRESSION & ANXIETY 348, 349 (2008); Pitman et 
al., supra note 128, at 189; Kelly Skelton et al., PTSD and Gene Variants:  New Pathways 
and New Thinking, 62 NEUROPHARMACOLOGY 628, 631 (2012); Hidenori Yamasue et al., 
Gender-Common and -Specific Neuroanatomical Basis of Human Anxiety-Related 
Personality Traits, 18 CEREBRAL CORTEX 46, 46 (2007). 
 132. Paulus, supra note 131, at 351–52. 
 133. Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is classified as a traumatic and stress-related 
disorder in the DSM-5.  The essential element of PTSD is the development of certain 
symptoms after exposure to an extremely traumatic event or experience that involves actual 
or threatened death or serious injury to oneself or others.  The categories of symptoms 
resulting from exposure to the triggering event include persistent reexperiencing of the 
trauma, persistent negative cognitions and mood, avoidance of stimuli associated with the 
trauma and a numbing of general responsiveness, as well as a number of symptoms 
associated with increased arousal.  To receive a diagnosis of PTSD, these symptoms must be 
present for more than one month, must interfere with regular functioning, and must not be 
attributable to a medication, substance use, or other illness. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, 
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS § 309.81 (5th ed. 2013) 
[hereinafter DSM-5].  Otherwise, the individual is eligible for a diagnosis of acute stress 
disorder, which will change to PTSD if the symptoms are still present one month after the 
trauma occurred. Id. § 308.3. 
 134. Thomas Steckler & Victoria Risbrough, Pharmacological Treatment of PTSD—
Established and New Approaches, 62 NEUROPHARMACOLOGY 617, 617 (2012). 
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1.   The Neural Foundations of Memory and Fear 
Learning, memory, and perception are all involved in experiencing acute 
stress.135  Learning and memory are complex processes in which neurons 
modulate the strength and structure of their interconnections.136  These 
processes are a type of brain plasticity, which is the relatively rapid and 
reversible change in brain structure and function.137  Studies in 
neuroscience indicate that even a single exposure to a traumatic event can 
cause long-lasting cellular changes (or stress-induced plasticity) in the 
amygdala, the structure believed to be central to both anxiety and 
memory.138 
When an individual experiences stress, the experience is encoded into the 
working memory, the short-term memory,139 and finally consolidated into 
the long-term memory.140  Memories are stored in the form of an increase 
in synaptic strength or in the pattern of the synapses themselves.141  The 
consolidation process involves the transfer of information from labile, 
short-term memory into long-term memory.142  The consolidation process 
enables the interpretation of emotional information as well as controls the 
mechanisms that influence what individuals perceive in their environment 
and how they interpret that information (the attentional and interpretive 
processes).143 
The brain is very efficient in creating long-term memories of emotionally 
significant events, both positive and traumatic.144  Two key structures are 
 
 135. James L. McGaugh & Benno Roozendaal, Memory Modulation, in LEARNING AND 
MEMORY:  A COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE 521–53 (John H. Byrne ed. 2009). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Rudi De Raedt, Does Neuroscience Hold Promise for the Further Development of 
Behavior Therapy?  The Case of Emotional Change After Exposure in Anxiety and 
Depression, 47 SCANDINAVIAN J. PSYCHOL. 225, 226 (2006); see also Feder et al., supra note 
127, at 453. 
 138. Roozendaal et al., supra note 128, at 429. 
 139. Short-term memory is the modification of already synthesized molecules, which 
strengthens existing connections. Kelsey C. Martin et al., Molecular Mechanisms Underlying 
Learning-Related Long-Lasting Synaptic Plasticity, in THE NEW COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES 
121 (Michael S. Gazzaniga ed., 2000). 
 140. Long-term memory involves the synthesis of new messenger RNA and new proteins, 
a process that can result in the induction and stabilization of long-lasting forms of entirely 
new synthesized neural connections. Gary Lynch, Memory Consolidation and Long-Term 
Potentiation, in THE NEW COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES, supra note 139, at 139. See generally 
Amy F. T. Arnsten, Stress Signaling Pathways That Impair Prefrontal Cortex Structure and 
Function, 10 NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 410 (2009); Robert S. Blumenfeld & Charan 
Ranganath, Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex Promotes Long-Term Memory Formation 
Through its Role in Working Memory Organization, 26 J. NEUROSCIENCE 916 (2006). 
 141. Lynch, supra note 140, at 139. 
 142. Garakani et al., supra note 121, at 944–45; Oliver T. Wolf, Stress and Memory in 
Humans:   Twelve Years of Progress?, 1293 BRAIN RES. 142, 144 (2009). 
 143. LeDoux, supra note 123, at 174; Wolf, supra note 142, at 147. 
 144. James L. McGaugh, Memory Consolidation and the Amygdala:   A Systems 
Perspective, 25 TRENDS NEUROSCIENCE 456, 456 (2002); McGaugh & Roozendaal, supra 
note 135, at 521.  Emotionally significant experiences tend to be well remembered. 
McGaugh, supra note 144, at 456; Roozendaal et al., supra note 128, at 423; Wolf, supra 
note 142, at 148–49. 
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associated with this process.  The amygdala, or the “emotion center,” 
stimulates the “arousal system” when trauma and stress are experienced,145 
and the prefrontal cortex is considered the controlling mechanism to keep 
our emotions in check.  The prefrontal cortex regulates our experience of 
emotion and naturally compensates for aversive events.  When functioning 
properly the prefrontal cortex facilitates the formation of new connections 
that override the traumatic memory, a process called extinction.146 
The consolidation of a traumatic memory forms the basis for trauma and 
stress-related disorders, including PTSD.147  The amygdala and the 
prefrontal cortex circuitry is central to this process.148  Research suggests 
that when this circuitry is disrupted, anxiety results.149  This is because the 
amygdala is hyperactive and the controlling mechanisms in the prefrontal 
cortex are inadequately recruited.  In other words, acute stress impairs the 
prefrontal cortical function.150  This malfunction or dysregulation leads to 
alterations in interpretive processes, or more precisely, a threat-oriented 
bias in anxious individuals.  As a result of this bias, individuals with anxiety 
disorders react to stimuli that objectively would be interpreted as neutral or 
only mildly aversive with distress, hyperarousal, and attempts to avoid the 
anxiety-provoking object or situation.151 
During and following a stressful event, the brain is flooded with stress 
hormones, which results in a number of physiological changes to the neural 
networks that regulate memory and fear.152  The flooding of stress 
hormones solidifies the memory of the trauma by enhancing the 
consolidation process of the mental and emotional experience of the 
event.153  In addition, the neurotransmitter norepinephrine has a central role 
in regulating stress effects on memory consolidation.154 
 
 145. McGaugh, supra note 144, at 456–57 (discussing how the basolateral complex of the 
amygdala (BLA) is activated by emotional arousal and helps make significant experiences 
memorable by enhancing the consolidation of long-lasting memory in other brain regions); 
Roozendaal et al., supra note 128, at 423. 
 146. Roozendaal et al., supra note 128, at 427, 430–31. 
 147. Pitman et al., supra note 128, at 189. 
 148. Amit Etkin & Tor D. Wager, Functional Neuroimaging of Anxiety:  A Meta-Analysis 
of Emotional Processing in PTSD, Social Anxiety Disorder, and Specific Phobia, 164 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 1476, 1484 (2007); Kevin S. LaBar et al., Human Amygdala Activation During 
Conditioned Fear Acquisition and Extinction:   A Mixed-Trial fMRI Study, 20 NEURON 937, 
939 (1998); Ulrich-Lai & Herman, supra note 128, at 401. 
 149. Sonja J. Bishop, Neurocognitive Mechanisms of Anxiety:  An Integrative Account, 11 
TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 307, 308 (2007); see Richard A. Friedman, Why Teenagers Act 
Crazy, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2014, at SR1 (describing amygdala and prefrontal cortex circuit 
dysfunction in anxiety disorders). 
 150. Arnsten, supra note 140, at 410–11. 
 151. Bishop, supra note 149, at 307. 
 152. Roozendaal et al., supra note 128, at 424–25. 
 153. McGaugh & Roozendaal, supra note 135, at 205. 
 154. Roozendaal et al., supra note 128, at 423–25.  Noradrenergic activity in the BLA is 
critical to modulating other hormones and transmitters involved in memory consolidation.  A 
neurotransmitter system comprised of noradrenergic neurons is how norepinephrine is 
transmitted through the brain.  Noradrenergic neurons act on adrenergic receptors located in 
the amygdala, hippocampus, hypothalamus, thalamus, as well as numerous other brain 
structures and the spinal cord.  Because of the large number of areas that contain adrenergic 
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During acute stress, the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis 
becomes hyperactive.  This hyperactivity affects the delicate balance of 
neurochemicals in an individual and has been shown to cause illness.155  
Chronic activation of the HPA axis can cause elevated levels of cortisol in 
the body, which can cause atrophy of the hippocampus.156  Studies show 
that this series of events—adrenal stress hormones which trigger the 
regulation and consolidation of memory—holds true for emotionally 
arousing information, such as trauma and stress, but does not affect the 
consolidation of memory of emotionally neutral information.157  When 
memory is “retrieved,” the fear response can be retriggered, which forms 
the basis for PTSD.158 
2.   Neuroscience Studies of PTSD 
Scientists study disproportionate fear responses by using fear 
conditioning,159 and focusing on different parts of the brain, to gain 
valuable insight into the origins and neural bases of those responses.160  The 
lateral amygdala has been a primary structure of interest in the study of 
memory and fear,161 and research studying fear conditioning in both 
animals and humans supports the hypothesis that a common element of 
PTSD specifically, and emotional distress in general, may be amygdalar 
dysfunction.162  Recent research reveals that dysfunction in PTSD goes 
beyond the amygdala itself and encompasses the corticolimbic circuit, 
 
receptors, when the norepinephrine system is activated, a significant area of the brain is 
affected.  The BLA influences the consolidation of memory through its many connections to 
other brain structures.  The BLA projects directly to the caudate nucleus and both directly 
and indirectly to the hippocampus.  The BLA also has connections to the insular cortex, 
which other studies have revealed is a common denominator in the manifestation and 
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 160. Garakani et al., supra note 121, at 941; LaBar et al., supra note 148, at 937. 
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and Emotion, 6 MOLECULAR PSYCHIATRY 13, 13 (2001); Garakani et al., supra note 121, at 
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Identification of a Signaling Network in Lateral Nucleus of Amygdala Important for 
Inhibiting Memory Specifically Related to Learned Fear, 111 CELL 905, 905 (2002); Wolf, 
supra note 142, at 147. 
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which includes the prefrontal cortex, hippocampus, and amygdala.163  In 
addition, studies suggest that PTSD sufferers may have a preexisting 
genetic vulnerability of the HPA axis, which increases the likelihood of 
HPA dysregulation after acute trauma exposure and a higher likelihood of 
developing PTSD or other stress-related disorders.164 
Neuroimaging results in human subjects using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) show that fear conditioning leads to increases in 
amygdalar activity.165  Once the amygdala detects danger, it can activate 
various “arousal” networks, which then can influence sensory 
processing.166  Following fear conditioning, the information transmitted 
from the amygdala results in the individual experiencing and exhibiting a 
fear response.167  Functional MRI studies have also revealed the 
relationship between the amygdala and medial prefrontal regions in 
PTSD.168 
For example, a 2004 study compared PET scans of thirty-six Vietnam 
veterans with diagnosed PTSD to PET scans of Vietnam veterans without 
PTSD.169  Results of the study indicated hyperresponsivity of the amygdala 
and hyporesponsivity of medial prefrontal regions and that these responses 
are reciprocally related.170  The more hyper- and hypoactive these regions 
were, the more severe the symptoms.  These results support the hypothesis 
that PTSD symptoms reflect extreme dysregulation in these regions and 
neural mechanisms.  While such a relationship between the amygdala and 
medial prefrontal regions in clinically diagnosed PTSD patients had been 
suspected, no previous studies in the literature had documented data in 
support of such a relationship. 
Studies have also begun to document and distinguish at the chemical and 
structural level between PTSD and other anxiety disorders.  In 2007, Etkin 
and Wager conducted a meta-analysis of studies that had used brain scans to 
investigate emotional processing in patients with anxiety disorders.171  The 
meta-analysis compared fMRI and PET scans of individuals with one of 
 
 163. See Steckler & Risbrough, supra note 134, at 617. 
 164. Rachel Yehuda, Status of Glucocorticoid Alterations in Post-traumatic Stress 
Disorder, 1179 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 56, 58 (2009). 
 165. Christian Büchel et al., Brain Systems Mediating Aversive Conditioning:  An Event-
Related fMRI Study, 20 NEURON 947, 954 (1998); LaBar et al., supra note 148, at 937. 
 166. See LeDoux, supra note 123, at 177; Etkin & Wager, supra note 148, at 1482 
(stating that information is transmitted from the amygdala to the behavioral, autonomic, and 
endocrine response control systems located in the brainstems). 
 167. Shumyatsky et al., supra note 162, at 905. 
 168. See generally Lisa M. Shin et al., Regional Cerebral Blood Flow in the Amygdala 
and Medial Prefrontal Cortex During Traumatic Imagery in Male and Female Vietnam 
Veterans with PTSD, 61 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 168 (2004). 
 169. Id. at 169.  The researchers used script-driven imagery to conduct the study. Id.  All 
of the male participants had served in combat and all of the female participants had served as 
nurses in Vietnam. Id.  None of the veterans had a history of head injury, neurological 
disorders, or other major conditions. Id. 
 170. Id.  The reciprocal or inverse relationship between the two regions means that as the 
amygdala becomes more active or hyperresponsive, the prefrontal cortex becomes more 
inhibited or hyporesponsive. 
 171. Etkin & Wager, supra note 148, at 1476. 
2015] THE FUTURE OF EMOTIONAL HARM 2631 
three anxiety disorders—PTSD, social anxiety disorder, and specific 
phobia—with the scans of healthy individuals who had undergone fear 
conditioning.  The results indicated that patients with the anxiety disorders 
showed consistently greater activity in the amygdala and insula.172  Even 
more significant, the dysregulation in the neural circuitry of PTSD patients 
was more exaggerated than that of patients suffering from the other anxiety 
disorders.173  The results of this study have revealed both that the amygdala 
and insula are critical structures in the common neurobiological pathway in 
anxiety disorders and support the view that a core fear system exists and 
when it is activated, anxiogenic174 symptoms result.175 
Recent studies reveal further importance of the anterior cingulated 
corteces in PTSD.  In 2008, Kasai compared twins with combat-related 
PTSD to their co-twins who had no history of trauma.  The PTSD group 
had lower gray matter volumes in the subgenual anterior cingulated cortex 
(sACC) compared to their non-PTSD co-twins.176  This finding is 
significant because it suggests that abnormalities in the sACC are a marker 
for PTSD instead of a risk factor for the disorder.  A similar study examined 
the dorsal anterior cingulated cortex (dACC) and found both PTSD twins 
and their non-PTSD co-twins had increased metabolic rates in their 
dACC.177  Since the abnormalities were the same in both twins, the effect is 
considered a risk factor for developing PTSD.178 
Studies suggest that the dACC plays a crucial part in both physical and 
emotional pain.179  Chronic pain patients who have their dACC removed 
say that they can still feel the pain but it no longer bothers them, linking 
unpleasantness with the physical sensation.180  A recent neuroimaging study 
tested “social pain” reactions among subjects and found that the dACC 
 
 172. See id. at 1480–81. 
 173. Id.  Only patients with PTSD showed hypoactivation in the dorsal and rostral 
anterior cingulated cortices and ventromedial prefrontal cortex—additional structures linked 
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and trauma-related disorders. Id. 
 174. Anxiogenic is synonymous with reflecting, causing, or producing anxiety; not every 
anxiety disorder reaches the level of PTSD.  Some individuals may simply experience 
generalized disturbances in anxiety or mood.  But neuroscience advances now indicate that 
that these neural changes occur for anxiety disorder in general, with individuals diagnosed 
with PTSD displaying the most dramatic alterations in neural circuitry and consequently the 
most severe symptoms. Id. 
 175. Id. at 1485. 
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Matter Loss from a Twin Study of Combat-Related Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 63 
BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 550, 550 (2008). 
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Disorder, 198 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 979, 983 (2011). 
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 179. See, e.g., Naomi I. Eisenberger, Broken Hearts and Broken Bones:  A Neural 
Perspective on the Similarities Between Social and Physical Pain, 21 CURRENT DIRECTIONS 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 42 (2012). 
 180. Id. at 43. 
2632 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
response in individuals who were socially excluded experienced heightened 
dACC activity compared to those who were not.181  This suggests that 
physical pain and emotional pain are not that different as registered in the 
brain scan. 
PTSD can also quantifiably affect the hippocampus.  A meta-analysis of 
structural MRI results in 2005 revealed that trauma-exposed individuals 
with PTSD had significantly decreased bilateral hippocampal gray matter 
than healthy controls and trauma-exposed controls without PTSD.182  
Several meta-analyses using other imaging mechanisms have revealed 
similar results.183  Another study suggests that hippocampal abnormalities 
may be the key to explaining symptomology of PTSD.184 
As discussed above, acute stress results in neuronal remodeling through 
the creation of new synaptic connections in the basolateral amygdala (BLA) 
and medial amygdala.  Some research reveals that a brief exposure to stress 
triggers a series of cellular changes that take time to come to an end, 
meaning there is a delay in the time it takes for the cellular changes in the 
BLA to be completed.185  The result of this time delay is that once 
triggered, the plasticity mechanisms continue after the event, despite 
restoration of normal levels of neurotransmitters and hormones.186  This 
means that a single brief exposure to stress results in some modest 
structural changes at the synaptic level that take time to build up and to 
slow down—that is, they have delayed anxiogenic effects at the behavioral 
level.187 
This finding—that even a single exposure to a traumatic event can cause 
long-lasting cellular changes, or stress-induced plasticity, in the brain—is 
highly significant.  It may be an important mechanism in the development 
of trauma-related disorders such as PTSD.  Retrieving the memory of 
“emotionally arousing information induces greater activity in and 
connectivity between the amygdala and the hippocampus” than retrieving 
the memory of emotionally neutral information.188  This evidence suggests 
that emotionally relevant and emotionally neutral information are treated 
differently and stored through different mechanisms and processes in the 
brain. 
 
 181. Id. at 45. 
 182. Noriyuki Kitayama et al., Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) Measurement of 
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77 (2012). 
 184. See generally Chris R. Brewin et al., Intrusive Images in Psychological Disorders:   
Characteristics, Neural Mechanisms, and Treatment Implications, 117 PSYCHOL. REV. 210 
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 188. Id. at 426. 
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Animal research further illustrates the importance of the hippocampal-
amygdalar circuit in PTSD.189  In one study, the authors focused on the 
inability of PTSD sufferers to restrict fear responses to appropriate 
predictors—i.e., panicking inappropriately when a car backfires.  Noting 
that glucocorticoids increase stress and have been shown to be involved in 
the pathophysiology of PTSD, the team injected corticosterone into the 
dorsal hippocampi of one group of rats and tested their fear response 
against a control group.190  As predicted, the corticosterone group displayed 
inappropriate fear responses similar to PTSD symptoms.191  This study 
provides solid evidence for one potential mechanism of PTSD. 
New research is also beginning to connect mild traumatic brain injury 
(mTBI) to PTSD.  Veterans with mTBI develop PTSD at a higher rate than 
others.192  A recent meta-analysis found overlap in abnormality in the 
middle frontal gyrus in both PTSD and mTBI.193  Other researchers suggest 
that there may be dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, orbital frontal cortex, 
autonomic nervous system, and hippocampus involvement, but fMRI 
research on mTBI is too limited to gain an accurate picture of the 
relationship right now.194  With increased attention focused on the 
detrimental effects of sports concussions and combat mTBI, there will 
likely be more studies examining the relationship between the two disorders 
in the near future. 
In sum, the physiological changes that occur in the brain after an 
individual experiences or witnesses a traumatic event can result in a 
dysfunction of the neural networks that regulate memory and fear.195  Even 
though the only clinical symptoms the individual may demonstrate are 
emotional in nature, scientists may now begin to document and observe 
multiple physiological changes that occur in the brain after experiencing 
trauma as a result of advanced neuroimaging techniques.196  The fact that 
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we have begun to detect these changes through neuroscience gives us the 
opportunity to quantify the effects of a stressful event without relying on 
self-reporting.  This evidence is beginning to enter the legal landscape in 
various ways,197 although it has not yet gained widespread use in the NIED 
area. 
B.   Medical Definition of Emotional Harm 
Medicine, and more specifically psychiatry, offer a related definitional 
approach to emotional harm, and it has received more widespread use in 
court.  Some courts have medicalized the legal definition completely, 
creating one of the highest thresholds for proof of emotional harm.  In 
particular, the British courts have long insisted upon a “recognized 
psychiatric illness” (RPI) as a threshold requirement for recovery for NIED.  
This rule was designed as a “powerful control mechanism” to meet the 
instrumentalist and normative concerns of curtailing the claim.198  This test 
has been adopted by other common law countries as well.199 
The RPI threshold requirement has been justified on three familiar 
grounds:   (1) as a mechanism to promote the policy of controlling the 
number and types of mental harm claims, thereby reducing the risk of 
indeterminate liability;200 (2) as a way to preclude mere anxiety, grief, or 
other “normal” suffering, which are considered “too remote to be 
compensable,” even if those harms are “reasonably foreseeable”;201 and 
 
diagnoses.  In other words, we validate our new tools with our old tools.  We have not yet 
reached the point at which these variables are an independent (and presumably more 
dependable) measure.  A brain scan alone does not answer the question whether an 
individual has suffered emotional harm; the researcher must look to other indicia.  Moreover, 
there may be imperfect correspondence between brain changes and behavioral dysfunction.  
We could measure changes in the brain that have no (or not yet any) manifestation in 
emotion, cognition, or behavior.  Or the experienced changes in emotion, cognition, and 
behavior may be present, but not (or not yet) observable in brain changes.  And there is 
always a danger that juries will prefer the evidence of neuroimaging over other forms of 
evidence, given our cultural addiction to faith in what is “physical,” although some studies 
suggest otherwise. See Nicholas J. Schweitzer et al., Neuroimages As Evidence in a Mens 
Rea Defense:   No Impact, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 357, 366 (2011) (finding no 
evidence that neuroimaging unduly influences juries over verbal neuroscience-based 
evidence; neuroscience evidence was more effective than clinical psychological evidence but 
the effect did not translate into differences in juries).  But while these limitations may be 
fodder for evidentiary challenges or cross-examination, it does not justify an absolute legal 
barrier to use of brain scan technology in this area. 
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(3) as a way to create a de minimis rule of damages, regardless of how 
harmful the anxiety or distress may be to the individual claimant.202 
The RPI test has been subject to numerous criticisms.203  Most 
significantly, critics note that the medical and legal approaches have 
different goals:  while the medical community is concerned with diagnosis 
and treatment, the law of emotional harm is concerned with whether the 
claimant has suffered and is entitled to compensation for some emotional 
harm.204  The main approach of the psychiatric diagnosis is to use 
diagnostic checklists based on clinical features, which were designed to 
give more reliability to clinical diagnoses when planning treatment.205  This 
means that a clinical diagnosis and the facts and judgment on which it is 
based may not align closely to the questions of concern in the law.206  
Further, some argue that reliance upon the classifications is problematic 
regardless of those differences, given that the diagnostic criteria change 
over time and may not be incorporated into the classifications.207 
Furthermore, although an RPI may reflect a longer-lasting psychiatric 
illness rather than a temporary problem of emotional distress,208 using an 
RPI to define emotional harm in law has been criticized as giving rise to 
inconsistencies and distortions in the law and as no longer being supported 
in the modern era.209  Some argue that a lower threshold—casting a wider 
net—should be sufficient to trigger a compensable emotional harm in 
negligence.210  Lowering the threshold would eliminate the problem of 
denying compensation to emotional suffering that is something less than a 
positive psychiatric illness.211  At the same time, the Restatement (Third) 
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views its test of “serious emotional harm” as having more commonality 
than difference with the British test of RPI: 
While there may be a modest difference between “serious emotional 
harm,” the term employed in [the] Restatement, and “psychiatric injury,” 
the British term, both terms have in common the effect of screening out 
minor or modest emotional harm that most people confront in the course 
of an interactive life in modern society.212 
Regardless of whether it is used as the determinative test, or one of 
several, the fundamental question is what constitutes a psychiatric injury 
from a medical perspective.  Two main diagnostic classification systems are 
typically used by the psychiatric community to diagnose a recognized 
psychiatric illness:   (1) the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM)213 of 
the American Psychiatric Association (APA), the latest iteration of which is 
the DSM-5; and (2) the International Classification of Diseases (ICD),214 
sponsored by the World Health Organization (WHO), which creates a 
statistical classification of diseases, with a section on mental disorders.  In 
general, these systems demonstrate that the nature of psychiatric diagnosis 
is constantly changing, and is not immune to political pressure. 
1.   DSM-5 
The first Diagnostic and Statistical Manual was published in 1952, with 
106 disorders.215  That number has since grown to over 300 since the DSM-
IV,216 and the DSM-5 has approximately the same number of disorders 
listed.217  As the quantity of disorders has increased, so has the DSM’s 
recognition as the “Bible” for mental health issues.  This widespread 
influence is not limited to the practice of psychiatry or medical academia.  
Insurance companies, litigators, and a number of patients’ rights and mental 
health advocacy groups use the DSM for guidance.218  However, the latest 
iteration of the manual, DSM-5, released in May 2013, has been broadly 
criticized by practitioners and outsiders alike, sparking an unusually high 
level of controversy compared to previous revisions.219  The DSM-5 has 
been criticized as highly politicized, driven by special interests groups, 
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especially the pharmaceutical industry,220 and overinclusive.221  It also has 
been criticized as failing in both reliability (the ability to render consistent 
diagnoses) and validity (the ability to diagnose legitimate mental 
illnesses).222  In general, the classifications are criticized because it is often 
difficult to fit a disorder into a distinct category as opposed to placing the 
disorder somewhere on a spectrum, and “modern psychiatry tends to aspire 
to the former, as does the law, [but] a lot of the tests used in the diagnosis of 
psychiatric disorder are of the latter sort.”223 
The DSM-5 has been highly controversial.  Allen Frances, the head of 
the APA task force responsible for revising the DSM-IV, called the APA’s 
 
 220. Generally, critics have noted that the subjective nature of the diagnosis and treatment 
of mental illness has made it a prime target for overprescription.  Some mental health 
professionals act as consultants to the drug industry. Michael Gross, Has the Manual Gone 
Mental?, 23 CURRENT BIOLOGY R295, R297–98 (2013).  Through them, the pharmaceutical 
companies “may try to influence the revision of diagnostic criteria in [their] favor.” Id. at 
R298.  Additionally, the strain on the healthcare system for mental health providers and 
dwindling primary doctor-patient interaction has made medication less expensive than long-
term psychiatric therapy.  Changes to the DSM-5 could lead to many diagnoses and drug 
regimens. Paula Span, Grief Over New Depression Diagnosis, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2013, 
6:40 AM), http://newoldage.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/24/grief-over-new-depression-
diagnosis.  Questions of the manual’s legitimacy also may come from within the APA itself.  
Publishing profits from the DSM-5 may be considered an impure motive, an observation that 
is exacerbated by the fact that the APA cancelled field-testing on the DSM-5 in order to 
reign in an already $25 million outlay on its preparation. Allen J. Frances, DSM 5 Is Guide 
Not Bible—Ignore Its Ten Worst Changes, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Dec. 2, 2012), 
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/dsm5-in-distress/201212/dsm-5-is-guide-not-bible-
ignore-its-ten-worst-changes.  Allen Frances, chair of the DSM-IV task force and one of the 
APA’s most outspoken critics, believes the conflict of interest lies elsewhere.  He contends 
that the current task force’s motives are not financial, but intellectual, resulting from “highly 
specialized experts [valuing] their [own] pet ideas [and] areas of research interest.” Id. 
 221. One of the most hotly contested changes to the DSM-5 is the exclusion of the long-
standing “bereavement exception” to the diagnosis of depression. Span, supra note 220.  
This is an attempt to compensate for the chronic underdiagnosis of depression in elderly 
patients, but practitioners fear that this will lead to a radical increase in the number of 
diagnoses with simple symptoms commonly associated with the aging process. See Bruce E. 
Levine, DSM-5:   Science or Dogma?  Even Some Establishment Psychiatrists Embarrassed 
by Newest Diagnostic Bible, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 11, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bruce-e-levine/dsm-5_b_2657667.html.  Other changes may 
also increase diagnostic rates, such as the condensing of four previously distinct categories 
of somatic disorders into one single category, see Gross, supra note 220, at R295, and the 
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final approval of the DSM-5 “the saddest moment in [his] 45 year 
career.”224  Other leading psychiatrists have branded it as a “broad 
overreach” by the APA, suggesting that the DSM no longer be considered 
the Bible but rather a dictionary for mental health diagnosis, at best.225  
This controversy is especially troublesome for legal practitioners, as courts 
may defer to the DSM’s definitions of mental illness in various ways.226  
Perhaps most tellingly, the DSM is falling from its perch as the standard by 
which mental health resources are allocated.  Beginning in the fall of 
2015,227 all HIPAA health care providers are required to switch to the 
World Health Organization’s (ICD-10-CM) code sets.228  Additionally, the 
National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) is reorienting its research away 
from the DSM categories and instead has begun to support research based 
on empirical studies, focusing on genetic, imaging, psychological, and 
cognitive data.229 
2.   ICD 
The ICD is issued by the World Health Assembly, which comprises 
health ministers from 193 countries.230  The latest iteration of the ICD, the 
ICD-10, was issued in 1992, and the ICD-11 is scheduled for release in 
2017.231 
Unlike the DSM, the ICD attempts to catalogue all human disease, not 
just mental disorders.232  Substantial differences exist between the DSM 
and the ICD’s classifications of mental disorders.  Some disorders find 
stricter diagnostic criteria under the ICD and others are more liberal.233  
Guidelines under the ICD do not include the social consequences of the 
disorder whereas diagnosis under the DSM often requires significant social 
impairment.234  The different definitions under the two classification 
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systems can and often do result in differing diagnostic results for any given 
patient.235  Both the WHO and the APA have worked on the DSM-5 and 
the forthcoming ICD-11 with an eye toward greater harmonization, but 
given the ubiquitous incongruence,236 the slightly dissimilar goals of the 
respective projects,237 and pragmatic concerns,238 comprehensive 
harmonization is likely impossible.239 
The difference in the approach under the two systems is highlighted by 
the diagnostic criteria for PTSD under both systems.  DSM-5 is explicit as 
to what constitutes a qualifying traumatic event for PTSD, limiting these to 
exposure to threatened or actual death, serious injury, or sexual violence.240  
Following the event, the patient must experience “intrusion symptoms,”241 
 
at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2802383.  Assen Jablensky notes the 
conceptual differences “highlight the provisional nature of many nosological concepts and 
their arbitrary definitions.”  Assen Jablensky, Towards ICD-11 and DSM-V:   Issues Beyond 
‘Harmonization,’ 195 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 379, 380 (2009), available at 
http://bjp.rcpsych.org/content/195/5/379.long. 
 235. “These definitional differences go beyond mere appearance; most studies which 
have investigated diagnostic concordance by applying both DSM-IV and ICD-10 criteria to 
the same individuals have found differences in case identification ranging from minor to 
significant.” First, supra note 233, at 382. 
 236. As Michael First states: 
Harmonisation of [conceptual] differences is likely to be especially challenging as 
it will require that either the DSM-V or ICD-11 work group relinquish its 
diagnostic approach in favour of the other group’s approach.  On the other hand, 
many differences in DSM-IV and ICD-10 definitions are not conceptually based 
but instead represent different ways of operationalising the same underlying 
diagnostic constructs.  Efforts to harmonise these non-conceptually based 
differences are comparatively more straightforward. 
Id. at 382–83. 
 237. As Mario Maj states: 
In the case of the ICD, the main objective is to improve the public health utility of 
the system, and in particular its usability by a range of health professionals.  In the 
case of the DSM, the main objective, or one of the main objectives, is to make the 
clinical characterization of each patient more comprehensive, by adding several 
dimensions to the categorical diagnosis. 
Mario Maj, Psychiatric Diagnosis:   Pros and Cons of Prototypes vs. Operational Criteria, 
10 J. WORLD PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N 81, 81 (2011). 
 238. See First, supra note 233, at 382. 
 239. As Maj continues: 
It is almost inevitable that the DSM classification of mental disorders differs from 
that of the WHO.  The ICD is a comprehensive classification of all . . . diseases 
and related health problems for use by a wide range of health professionals in 
countries of very varied sizes, cultures, and resources.  The APA’s classification is 
designed to meet the needs of one, or perhaps two, professions—psychiatrists and 
clinical psychologists—in a single country. 
Id. at 38 (quoting Robert Kendell, The Relationship Between DSM-IV and ICD-10, 100 J. 
ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 297, 299–300 (1991)). 
 240. DSM-5, supra note 213, at 271–80.  “Exposure” may be either:  direct; witnessing; 
indirect (learning that a close family member or close friend was exposed to violent or 
accidental trauma); or repeated or extreme indirect exposure to aversive details of the 
traumatic event(s), usually in the course of professional duties (for example, first responders 
collecting body parts and professionals repeatedly exposed to details of child abuse). See id. 
 241. The patient must experience one of the following:  (1) recurrent, involuntary, and 
intrusive memories; (2) traumatic nightmares; (3) dissociative reactions (e.g., flashbacks) 
which may occur on a continuum from brief episodes to complete loss of consciousness; 
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persistent effortful avoidance of distressing, trauma-related stimuli,242 
“negative alterations in cognitions [or] mood,”243 and “alterations in arousal 
and reactivity.”244  These symptoms must persist for at least a month.245  
Additionally, the patient must also suffer significant symptom-related social 
or occupational impairment.246 
Though similar, the diagnostic criteria for PTSD under ICD-10 differ in 
several significant ways.  The ICD-10 does not specify what constitutes a 
qualifying traumatic event, only requiring that the event be “of 
exceptionally threatening or catastrophic nature, which is likely to cause 
pervasive distress in almost anyone”; it has no criteria as to how long 
symptoms must persist; has no functional impairment requirement; and has 
no subtypes.247  It is not hard to imagine differing diagnoses with regard to 
PTSD depending on which system the psychiatrist applies. 
Regardless of the approach, there are considerable problems with the 
overarching categorical approach that is common to both the ICD and the 
DSM.  This approach tends to falsely dichotomize what are likely non-
discrete disease entities, while it underappreciates the individuality of the 
patient within each artificially drawn category.248  Moreover, diagnoses are 
given purely symptomatically, according to the number of relevant 
symptoms that are present or absent as self-reported by the patient and 
subjectively interpreted by the physician.249  This method of diagnosis is 
unique to psychiatric disorders and brings with it inherent problems.250 
 
(4) intense or prolonged distress after exposure to traumatic reminders; or (5) marked 
physiologic reactivity after exposure to trauma-related stimuli. See id. 
 242. That is, avoidance of either thoughts or feelings of the event, or external reminders 
of the event. Id. 
 243. The patient must experience two of the following (having either begun or worsened 
after the event):  (1) inability to recall key features of the traumatic event (usually 
dissociative amnesia; not due to head injury, alcohol, or drugs); (2) persistent (and often 
distorted) negative beliefs and expectations about oneself or the world (e.g., “I am bad,” 
“The world is completely dangerous”); (3) persistent distorted blame of self or others for 
causing the traumatic event or for resulting consequences; (4) persistent negative trauma-
related emotions (e.g., fear, horror, anger, guilt, or shame); (5) markedly diminished interest 
in (pretraumatic) significant activities; (6) feeling alienated from others (e.g., detachment or 
estrangement); or (7) constricted affect:  persistent inability to experience positive emotions. 
See id. 
 244. The patient must experience two of the following (having either begun or worsened 
after the event):  (1) irritable or aggressive behavior; (2) self-destructive or reckless 
behavior; (3) hypervigilance; (4) exaggerated startle response; (5) concentration problems; or 
(6) sleep disturbance. See id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id.  The DSM-5 maintains a PTSD subtype with differing criteria for children. Id. 
 247. WHO, THE ICD-10 CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL AND BEHAVIOURAL DISORDERS:  
DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA FOR RESEARCH (1992), available at http://www.who.int/classifications 
/icd/en/GRNBOOK.pdf. 
 248. See Goldberg et al., supra note 232, at 41–42. 
 249. See Tadafumi Kato, A Renovation of Psychiatry Is Needed, 10 J. WORLD 
PSYCHIATRY 198, 198 (2011). 
 250. As Kato states: 
To further refine psychiatric diagnosis, the only way is to establish a new disease 
classification based on the neurobiological features of each mental 
disorder . . . .  We psychiatrists should be aware that we cannot identify “diseases” 
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Furthermore, not everyone views the use of the diagnostic classifications 
as dispositive in determining whether an individual suffers from a 
psychiatric illness.  Instead, some legal experts believe that a clinical 
judgment can and should deviate from the classifications in certain 
circumstances.251  Under this view, even for those courts that require an 
RPI for NIED claims, the classifications are not definitive in the 
courtroom.252  At the other extreme, some courts in the United Kingdom 
applied the DSM criteria themselves, finding they are competent to do so as 
a “common sense application” of the criteria.253  Still another approach is to 
create a statutory definition of RPI, drawing from a state-appointed panel of 
experts, although this approach was rejected by the English Law 
Commission, as “not practicable” and “fraught with difficulty.”254  In the 
United States, only a minority of jurisdictions use an RPI as a threshold 
requirement.255 
Regardless of how evidence of an RPI is used, expert testimony from 
mental health professionals engenders the same problem as all claims that 
intersect law and science:  expert witnesses might present conflicting 
diagnoses.  As discussed below, this problem is more appropriately dealt 
with as a question of admissibility of evidence, including subjecting the 
testimony to Daubert tests. 
C.   Creating Norms 
In addition to scientific and medical viewpoints, normative values inform 
the definition of emotional harm as well.  From this perspective, emotional 
harm is a social construct that is intimately tied to setting norms about the 
 
only by interviews.  What we are doing now is just like trying to diagnose diabetes 
mellitus without measuring blood sugar.  Medicine is fundamentally based on 
pathology.  Psychiatry should also be based on pathology rather than 
psychology . . . .  All the technologies we need to refine psychiatry have already 
been established.  What we should do is to study the neurobiological basis of 
mental disorders using updated technologies and give rise to the renovation in 
psychiatry. 
Id. at 198–99. 
 251. Mulheron, supra note 198, at 89. 
 252. See id. at 90. 
 253. Id. at 92 (citing Calvert v. William Hill Credit Ltd., [2008] EWHC (Ch) 454, [134]). 
This is despite the APA’s own admonition that “[i]t is important that [the DSM] not be 
applied mechanically by untrained individuals.” AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND 
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS IV xxxii (4th ed. 1994). 
 254. ENGLISH LAW COMM’N, LIABILITY FOR PSYCHIATRIC ILLNESS LC249 ¶¶ 5.2, 5.4 
(1998), available at http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc249_liability_for_ 
psychiatric_illness.pdf. 
 255. See, e.g., Pierce v. Atl. Grp., Inc., 724 S.E.2d 568, 577 (N.C. App. 2012) (quoting 
Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assoc., P.A., 395 S.E. 85, 97 (N.C. 1990) 
(defining severe emotional distress as “any emotional or mental disorder . . . which may be 
generally recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so”); Agnesini v. Doctor’s 
Assoc., Inc., 10 CV 9190 (BSJ) (FM), 2012 WL 5873605, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2012) 
(same); Hegel v. McMahon, 960 P.2d 424, 431 (Wash. 1998) (bystander case); Asuncion v. 
Columbia Hosp. for Women, 514 A.2d 1187, 1189 (D.C. 1986) (same); Paz v. Brush 
Engineered Materials, Inc., 949 So. 2d 1, 4 (Miss. 2007) (medical monitoring case). 
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appropriate way to respond to an adverse event.256  This is reflected in a 
deeper question of subjectivity and agency—the notion that emotional harm 
is sometimes in the victim’s control.257  When we tell children not to “make 
a mountain out of a molehill,” we are suggesting to them that their response 
is at least partially within their control.258  Professors Goldberg and 
Zipursky argue that “the much-vaunted fraud objection [in NIED] is in fact 
a loose way of expressing the concerns that particular plaintiffs in 
emotional distress cases are making mountains out of molehills, and that 
permitting a cause of action for pure emotional harm will invite or 
encourage citizens to make mountains out of molehills.”259  This reflects 
the norm that one should “just get over it,” as well as expresses the ideal 
that individuals are responsible for their emotional response.260  Under this 
view, a person’s agency is integral to the response of emotional distress.261 
Moreover, requiring a showing that the emotional harm is “severe” or 
“serious”262 also can imply a normative value that an individual is partially 
responsible for her reaction to a situation.  Cases awarding damages for 
“severe” or “serious” emotional harm could suggest that a plaintiff’s 
emotional harm is severe as compared to others;263 or it could demonstrate 
 
 256. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 28, at 1680 (claiming that “[d]on’t make a 
mountain out of a molehill” reinforces social norms on appropriate response). 
 257. Id. at 1676–77 (labeling this as the “agency concern”); see also Goldberg, supra note 
87, at 816–17 (arguing for a duty to reasonably regulate one’s own emotional health based 
on normative ideals of mental well-being). 
 258. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 28, at 1680. 
 259. Id. at 1680–81.  Studies involving the nocebo effect, in which harmless substances 
cause harmful effects in patients who receive them, provide an interesting comparison. See 
generally Winfried Hauser et al., Nocebo Phenomena in Medicine:  Their Relevance in 
Everyday Clinical Practice, 109 DEUTSCHES ARZTEBLATT 459 (2012) (including a meta-
analysis of all studies mentioning “nocebo effect” in PubMed up to December 2011).  These 
studies support the view that a patient’s response to a given treatment is affected by the 
patient’s expectations. See id. at 461.  The response effects can be either psychological or 
physiological. See id. at 465. 
 260. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 28, at 1681. 
 261. See id.  Reliance on this idea of “agency,” in which the plaintiff’s emotional 
response is her responsibility, undercuts the notion that the defendant inflicted harm upon the 
plaintiff.  Id. at 1685; see Fox & Stein, supra note 19 (describing the assumption in tort law 
that a victim of negligence can control his mental anguish, a power he lacks over his bodily 
injuries and how this assumption “makes standalone emotional harm unworthy of 
compensation”); Keating, supra note 96, at 300 (“Our emotional reactions are mediated by 
our minds.  Emotional injury may thus be the product—not the negation—of our 
agency . . . .  We can teach ourselves to toughen up and not be so sensitive, and we can steel 
ourselves against even exceedingly unpleasant experiences.”); Goldberg, supra note 87, at 
860 (“People have profound abilities to find ways to mitigate their emotional and 
psychological despair . . . .”).  The normative concept of emotional harm, and the 
corresponding duty to regulate one’s own emotional health, raises the issue of comparative 
fault:  How will we evaluate whether individuals sufficiently avoided—or contributed to—
their emotional harm? 
 262. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:   LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§§ 46–47 (2012). 
 263. Id. § 47 cmt. j (requiring that the “harm be serious, [and] that the 
circumstances . . . be such that a reasonable person would suffer serious harm”); see 
Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 1970) (defining a serious injury as one “where 
a reasonable man, normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope with the mental 
stress engendered by the circumstances of the case”).  Whether an injury is serious would 
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that the circumstances surrounding the event are particularly extreme.264  
Under either view, normative judgments are being made about the extent of 
agency and control.  A reasonable person could not be expected to control 
her response in a situation that is particularly egregious or severe; in that 
case, she is a viewed as a victim rather than an agent.265  It is not fair to 
expect the individual to exercise agency over her response in those extreme 
situations.266 
Traditionally, normative values in tort law are reflected in jury decision 
making, but in NIED claims, these views of agency and emotional harm 
ultimately spill over into limited duty rules.  No duty and limited duty rules 
in tort law reflect certain assumptions and biases; their main advantage is 
the certainty they create in curtailing the claim.  The goal in the NIED area 
of precluding individual analysis reflects the “universal” nature of mental 
harm, naturally occurring while experiencing different life events.267  An 
early bias developed that these inevitable stresses of life would create “a 
certain toughening of the mental hide [which] is a better protection than the 
law could ever be.”268  In addition, instrumentalist concerns come into play:  
“Mental injuries . . . are different [from physical ones] because they are not 
constrained by time and space proximity and physical laws.”269  This leads 
to concerns about imposing liability out of proportion to the negligent act:  
“[W]e do not expect society to walk on eggshells fearing that any conduct 
that fails to meet an objective standard of proper behavior may result in 
significant liability.”270 
Categorical thinking, which persists in NIED claims, perpetuates these 
normative views.  But the compelling nature of those concerns is eroding.  
Views of agency, control, and malingering will continue to evolve in the 
face of scientific evidence of the physicality of those harms, as well as 
evidence of the impact of genetic and environmental factors on reactions to 
stressful situations.  For example, the diagnosis of PTSD as a genuine claim 
has become increasingly accepted in our society.271  Mental illness is 
 
presumably fall more appropriately within the damages consideration. See Goldberg, supra 
note 87, at 816 n.25. 
 264. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 28, at 1688 (using as an example Portee v. Jaffee, 
417 A.2d 521, 521 (N.J. 1980), in which a mother witnessed her five-year-old son die in an 
elevator shaft). 
 265. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 28, at 1688. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. 
L. REV. 1033, 1035 (1936). 
 269. Rhee, supra note 27, at 841; see Fox & Stein, supra note 19 (“[S]ingling out 
physical harms for standalone recovery might shore up the belief that while our bodies are 
open to poking and prodding, our minds remain hidden from external 
observation . . . .  Dualism helps to explain why the tort system scorns victims who suffer 
even serious and demonstrable emotional distress. . .”). 
 270. Rhee, supra note 27, at 852. 
 271. See Betsy J. Grey, Neuroscience, PTSD, and Sentencing Mitigation, 34 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 53, 58–59 (2012). 
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becoming destigmatized in various ways.272  As our societal view of 
emotional harm changes, this may eventually lead to allowing NIED claims 
to proceed like other negligence claims, allowing juries to determine the 
reasonable foreseeability that the defendant’s negligent behavior would 
cause emotional harm to a direct victim of normal psychological fortitude.  
But even before we reach this point—recognizing that the foreseeability test 
may not “adequately” address instrumental concerns of curtailing the scope 
of liability—courts can still trade some limited duty barriers for increased 
jury determination that would reflect changing normative views on 
emotional harm.  This shift will allow courts to adapt to the rapidly 
changing science and medical landscape as well, achieving more validity 
and flexibility in evaluating emotional harm.273 
IV.   REMOVING LIMITED DUTY BARRIERS BASED ON VALIDITY CONCERNS 
Categorical duty rules usurp the role of the jury.  Traditionally, the role 
of the jury is central to American tort law, in particular because we rely on 
the jury as members of the public to make factual and normative decisions 
on injury, causation, and fault.  The most recent Restatement of Torts on 
negligence274 contains a renewed emphasis on the centrality of the jury to 
negligence determinations for physical injury.275  The Restatement (Third) 
rejects the element of foreseeability as part of the court’s evaluation of legal 
duty, shifting the question for jury consideration.276  Section 7 of the 
 
 272. See Francis X. Shen, Mind, Body, and the Criminal Law, 97 MINN. L. REV. 2036, 
2038 (2013) (describing increasing acceptance among policymakers and the public that 
“illness of the brain must be treated just like illness anywhere else in the body”). 
 273. Cf. Rhee, supra note 27, at 865–68 (proposing a foreseeability test for direct victims 
of mental injury and a graduated test based on culpability for collateral victims and arguing 
that the determination of classes of victims will capture the necessary controls for limiting 
liability).  Rhee argues that the interest of direct victims derives from the right of self-
preservation, while the interest of the collateral victim is the safety or well-being of others, 
derivative of the relationship with the primary victim, either through a preexisting 
relationship or by a temporal and spatial connection to the accident. Id. at 856. 
 274. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
(2012). 
 275. See Elizabeth G. Porter, Tort Liability in the Age of the Helicopter Parent, 64 ALA. 
L. REV. 533, 565 (2013). 
 276. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 7 (2010); id. § 7 cmt. a (“When liability depends on factors specific to an individual case, 
the appropriate rubric is scope of liability.  On the other hand, when liability depends on 
factors applicable to categories of actors or patterns of conduct, the appropriate rubric is 
duty.  No-duty rules are appropriate only when a court can promulgate relatively clear, 
categorical, bright-line rules of law applicable to a general class of cases.”); id. § 7 cmt. j 
(“In order to determine whether appropriate care was exercised, the factfinder must assess 
the foreseeable risk . . . .  The extent of foreseeable risk depends on the specific facts of the 
case and cannot be usefully assessed for a category of cases; small changes in the facts may 
make a dramatic change in how much risk is foreseeable.  Thus . . . courts should leave such 
determinations to juries unless no reasonable person could differ on the matter.”).  This was 
a very controversial aspect of the Restatement (Third)’s attempt to constrain judicial power 
in negligence. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Foreseeability in Breach, Duty, and Proximate 
Cause, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1247, 1258 (2009) (challenging this approach because 
“almost every jurisdiction does treat foreseeability as a significant factor (and frequently the 
most significant factor) in analyzing whether the duty element is met in a negligence 
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Restatement (Third) states that when an actor’s conduct could create a risk 
of physical harm, the actor “ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable 
care,”277 and that courts should depart from this general duty only in 
“exceptional” cases, when “countervailing principle or policy warrants 
denying or limiting liability in a particular class of cases.”278  The use of the 
word “exceptional” represents “a renewed commitment to the strong norm 
of reasonable care.”279  Further, section 8 emphasizes that the questions of 
breach and proximate cause are within the province of the jury rather than 
the court.280  The combined effect of these provisions is to restrict the role 
of the court in making fact-based duty determinations, squarely assigning 
that role to the jury.281  The price of this commitment to increased jury 
participation is an expansion of the circumstances under which negligence 
suits may get to a jury—it likely will increase the number of suits surviving 
dispositive motions and either proceeding to trial or settling in terms more 
favorable to the plaintiffs.282 
At the same time, the Restatement (Third) does not follow the traditional 
balance of power between judge and jury for NIED claims, but instead 
assigns the fact-based duty determinations as a matter of law for the 
court.283  As discussed above, various policy considerations are cited in 
support of this view, but the dominating ones are the need to ensure the 
genuineness of the claim,284 to limit liability,285 as well as to eliminate 
claims for ordinary stress that is part of modern life.286 
We can begin to unpack the concerns captured by NIED limited duty 
rules and address them through different judicial mechanisms.  Evidence on 
genuine validity issues should be addressed by traditional judicial 
evidentiary admissibility standards and then sent to the jury for factual 
findings.  This would serve to reassert the jury’s traditional role with regard 
to this claim.  Instrumentalist concerns seeking to limit the claim for other 
reasons could still be addressed through certain special pleading 
requirements or more broadly be shifted to traditional duty and proximate 
cause analyses. 
 
claim.”).  Some states have begun to adopt this view. See, e.g., Gipson v. Kasey, 150 P.3d 
228, 231 (Ariz. 2007); Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829, 835 (Iowa 2009); A.W. v. 
Lancaster Cnty. Sch. Dist. 0001, 784 N.W.2d 907, 917 (Neb. 2010); Behrendt v. Gulf 
Underwriters Ins. Co., 768 N.W.2d 568, 576 (Wis. 2009). 
 277. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 7(a). 
 278. Id. § 7(b); see also id. § 7 cmt. a. 
 279. Porter, supra note 275, at 565–66. 
 280. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:   LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 8(b). 
 281. Porter, supra note 275, at 566. 
 282. Id. at 568. 
 283. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:   LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 47 cmt. g (2012). 
 284. See id. § 47 cmt. l. 
 285. See id. § 47 cmt. i. 
 286. Id. § 47 cmt. l. 
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Removing special pleadings requirements on validity issues follows 
naturally in the evolution of NIED claims.  For example, after courts started 
allowing the NIED claim, they adopted the physical manifestation test to 
address the concern of fraud.287  Courts gradually began to weaken the 
physical manifestation rule or reject it altogether, however, as science, 
medicine, and social norms changed and the test became inadequate or 
unnecessary.  A California case, Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,288 
proved to be the watershed.  In Molien, the California Supreme Court 
rejected the physical manifestation test as both overinclusive (permitting 
claims with little emotional harm because they manifested physical 
consequences) as well as underinclusive (barring claims of serious 
emotional harm but no physical manifestation).289  It rejected the claim-
screening function of the test and found that the jury, rather than the judge, 
should determine the validity of the claim.290  Consequently, plaintiffs did 
not need to present evidence of physical manifestation to meet either their 
burdens of production or persuasion—the jurors could simply rely on “their 
own experience” as well as the defendant’s behavior in evaluating the 
claim.291  This represented a major institutional shift to allowing more 
claims to be processed by the jury. 
Molien prompted other courts to reevaluate the NIED claim and the 
physical manifestation requirement.292  As courts began to move away from 
the physical manifestation rule, they cited a number of factors in this shift, 
including theoretical, scientific, and practical reasons, such as advances in 
science, a shift to a general foreseeability analysis, notions of fairness, and 
reliance on stronger evidentiary requirements.  Some courts were driven by 
their interpretation of scientific understanding of emotional harm.293  Other 
courts relied more heavily on common sense and equitable concerns.294  
 
 287. Physical manifestation could include a heart attack or an ulcer. See JOHN L. 
DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS § 10.01[B][2] (4th ed. 2010).  The physical 
manifestation of emotional harm is a prerequisite and does not measure the extent of the 
mental injury. See Diamond, supra note 29, at 146–47. 
 288. 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980). 
 289. Id. at 820. 
 290. Id. at 821. 
 291. Id. 
 292. See Chizmar v. Mackie, 896 P.2d 196, 202–03 (Alaska 1995) (discussing how 
physical manifestation might not be sufficient for jury to decide whether emotional injury is 
foreseeable and sufficiently “severe” or “serious,” even in the absence of accompanying 
physical injury or diagnosable illness, at least in cases where a preexisting duty is present); 
Corgan v. Muehling, 574 N.E.2d 602, 608–09 (Ill. 1991) (concluding that the “zone of 
danger” test does not apply to direct victims and allowing NIED claim regarding alleged 
malpractice of psychologist, despite lack of physical manifestation of emotional injury); Folz 
v. State, 797 P.2d 246, 259 (N.M. 1990) (allowing a cause of action in absence of physical 
injury and noting the “illogic of requiring as a threshold element the presence of physical 
injury to manifest the emotional trauma”). 
 293. See Corgan, 574 N.E.2d at 608–09 (describing scientific view of emotional 
responses to stress to determine emotional harm); Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758 (Haw. 
1974) (using reasonable foreseeability test but relying on medical proof to determine harm). 
 294. See Montinieri v. S. New Eng. Tel. Co., 398 A.2d 1180, 1184 (Conn. 1978) 
(appealing to logic; rejecting physical manifestation and impact tests). 
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Gradually, use of the physical manifestation test was cut back, but it was 
replaced with other limited duty barriers. 
One reason that these barriers persist is that, although the notion that 
fraud could lead to excessive and fictitious NIED lawsuits is consistently 
challenged,295 it has never been abandoned; most courts have maintained 
limited duty barriers to address these fraud concerns.  In particular, the 
Restatement (Third) does not require “physical manifestation,” but it still 
requires a showing of “serious” emotional harm.  The “seriousness” 
requirement acts as a screen to demonstrate the genuineness of the claim:  
“[t]he requirements that the harm be serious, that the circumstances of the 
case be such that a reasonable person would suffer serious harm, and that 
there be credible evidence that the plaintiff has suffered such harm better 
serve the purpose of screening claims than a requirement of physical 
consequences.”296  The seriousness requirement is designed to eliminate 
claims for everyday stress that is common in modern society as well as 
ensure that the claims are genuine.297 
Molien teaches us, however, that it is appropriate to reexamine limited or 
no-duty tests for the NIED claim when those tests are not serving their 
intended purpose.  Although the ability of neuroscience to predict 
psychological states remains controversial,298 advances in neuroscience will 
continue to challenge the traditional emotional harm doctrines designed to 
validate and measure emotional harm.299  Even if we are not at the point at 
which we can use neuroscience to establish definitively individual 
emotional harm, we are getting substantially closer to that point.  These 
advances will influence, in turn, medical and normative definitions of 
emotional harm.  As this occurs, limited duty rules, which serve as rough 
proxies for the genuineness and severity of harm suffered, need to be 
reexamined.  In particular, the traditional but historically weak limited duty 
rules of physical manifestation of emotional injury and the zone of impact 
tests (the latest iteration found in the Restatement (Third)) are further 
weakened as indicators of the validity and severity of distress.300  These 
barriers to emotional harm claims are now ripe for modification and 
dissolution. 
To aid in this endeavor, this Article proposes that any limited duty test 
should address only nonvalidity concerns.  Duty barriers based on 
assumptions about failure of proof should be removed, and the question of 
 
 295. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 28, at 1678–79.  Professors Goldberg and 
Zipursky argue that the fraud objection to general recovery for NIED is “unpersuasive for 
several reasons”:  (1) most of the reported cases involve situations in which there is little 
doubt that some emotional harm exists; (2) the concern whether the events unfolded in the 
way alleged by plaintiff is not unique to NIED; and (3) that the claim is based on a 
subjective mental state is not an obstacle in other areas. Id. 
 296. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:   LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 47 cmt. j (2012). 
 297. Id. § 47 cmt. l. 
 298. Cassin, supra note 118, at 960; Helen S. Mayberg, Neuroimaging and Psychiatry:  
The Long Road from Bench to Bedside, 44 HASTINGS CTR. REP. S31, S34 (2014). 
 299. Cassin, supra note 118, at 960. 
 300. Id. at 960–61. 
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validity should be determined on a case-by-case basis.  Questions about the 
state of scientific and medical knowledge should be worked out through a 
Daubert hearing.  This would allow individualized analysis of the harm 
itself.  If courts choose to maintain limited duty rules aimed at curtailing the 
claim for instrumentalist reasons, the limited duty rules should be 
reconstituted to address categories of claims, not the nature of an individual 
claim.  Alternatively, courts could go further and remove limited duty 
barriers in the NIED claim completely and rely upon traditional negligence 
duty and proximate cause tests as a way to curtail the number of claims.301 
Under this proposal, the Restatement (Third) requirement of a “serious” 
emotional harm would no longer be part of the duty analysis.  Instead, the 
seriousness of the harm would be a question for the fact-finder to 
determine.  Similarly, other special pleading tests courts use in the duty 
analysis as a substitute for validity screening would no longer be used, such 
as a physical contact or impact test, requiring a diagnosable psychiatric 
illness or physical symptomology.  Instead, duty barriers only would be 
used to address instrumental concerns of curtailing indeterminate liability.  
A type of limiting test to serve this purpose could be a zone of danger test, 
but one that includes either physical or emotional harm, or a relationship 
test based on reasonable expectations of the parties.  Limited duty tests such 
as these may be used to prevent disproportional liability.302 
Although relying on the artificial and arbitrary barriers developed by the 
courts no longer makes sense to address questions about the genuineness of 
the claim,303 strictly applying the DSM-5 or ICD-10 may not be supportable 
as well, since some but not all cases will be susceptible to medical 
diagnosis.  Even if they are susceptible, conflicting diagnoses may occur.304  
 
 301. Cf. Keating, supra note 96, at 291 (emotional harm in preexisting relationship cases 
should be viewed as proximate cause, not duty, cases). 
 302. The idea of focusing solely on instrumentalist concerns borrows from the limited 
duty tests developed in the area of economic loss for financial advice.  Most states follow the 
Restatement (Second) approach, which allows claims to proceed depending on the closeness 
of the relationship between the claimant and the defendant, an indication of “justifiable 
reliance.” See Nycal Corp. v. KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, 688 N.E.2d 1368 (Mass. 1998) 
(applying the Restatement (Second) of Torts test to a claim for negligent misrepresentation).  
The purpose of the test is to limit the number of claims to which the defendant (frequently an 
auditor or accountant) is exposed; the amount or validity of the claim is tested through 
traditional means of duty and causation analysis. See Jay M. Feinman, Liability of 
Accountants for Negligent Auditing:  Doctrine, Policy, and Ideology, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
17, 29–30, 41–48 (2003). 
 303. See Fox & Stein, supra note 19 (“As an experience of the body rather than mind, 
emotional harm is qualitatively the same as physical illness or injury. . . . It differs from 
[physical injury and illness] only in terms of evidence.”); see also Kolber, supra note 120, at 
834 (predicting that brain imaging technology may relieve legal limitations in tort law on 
recovery for stand-alone emotional harm claim); Emily F. Suski, Dark Sarcasm in the 
Classroom:   The Failure of the Courts to Recognize Students’ Severe Emotional Harm As 
Unconstitutional, 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV 125, 144–45 (2014) (arguing that courts should 
evaluate emotional harm in the same way as physical harm in cases of constitutional 
challenges under the Fourteenth Amendment for severe harm imposed by school officials). 
 304. See supra notes 240–47 and accompanying text.  Although I suggested in earlier 
writings that courts should dispense with heightened pleading requirements in determining 
the validity of NIED claims, except perhaps requiring medical diagnosis of a psychiatric 
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Instead, all evidence on validity—including and perhaps especially 
neuroscience evidence—should be screened through traditional evidentiary 
tests, including Daubert screening if necessary.305  Expert opinion could be 
used to demonstrate that the claimant’s injury is real, even if the injury does 
not rise to the level of a recognized psychiatric illness.  Allowing evidence 
on validity to proceed in this fashion should allow more flexibility to 
consider state-of-the-art scientific advances that occur in neuroscience.  
Although the plaintiff must still prove that he or she suffered actual 
damages, if successful, the plaintiff would recover for the full extent of the 
psychological harm, regardless of whether the full extent was foreseeable.  
In other words, the traditional “eggshell” plaintiff rule (we take our victims 
as we find them) would continue to apply. 
Under this formulation, a claimant can rely on expert testimony to show a 
diagnosed psychiatric injury, and also rely on other traditional evidentiary 
methods to prove the mental harm, including physical symptoms, 
neuroscientific tests, treatment, hospitalization, fact witnesses, or a 
combination of these factors.306  The jury will weigh this evidence for fact-
 
injury, see Grey, supra note 18, at 224, recent developments in this dynamic area have 
caused me to shift my views.  First, because neuroscience is a rapidly developing field, 
particularly in this area, it has become clear that evidence on validity should be addressed 
through evidentiary means rather than categorical thinking.  In addition, the controversies 
surrounding the DSM-5, as well as the increasing reliance on the ICD-10, also suggest that a 
medical diagnosis of psychiatric injury should be subject to traditional evidentiary standards, 
rather than used as a heightened pleading requirement. 
 305. With advances in technology proceeding rapidly, the technology’s admission as 
evidence has become increasingly common. See Jones et al., supra note 196, at 5.  
Neuroimaging has been admitted in criminal cases to support a range of issues. See, e.g., 
McNamara v. Borg, 923 F.2d 862, 862 (9th Cir. 1991) (mitigating factor from 
schizophrenia); United States v. Kasim, No. 2:07 CR 56, 2010 WL 339084, at *6 (N.D. Ind. 
Jan. 21, 2010) (incompetency to stand trial due to dementia); People v. Kraft, 5 P.3d 68, 98 
(Cal. 2000) (mitigating factor due to obsessive-compulsive disorder); People v. Holt, 937 
P.2d 213, 229–33 (Cal. 1997) (mitigation factor from brain abnormality); People v. 
Weinstein, 591 N.Y.S.2d 715, 722–23 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (non-responsibility because of a brain 
defect); Coe v. State, 17 S.W.3d 193, 232 (Tenn. 2000) (lack of competency to be executed).  
Similarly, in civil cases, neuroimaging has been admitted in a variety of contexts. See Boyd 
v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Players Ret. Plan, 410 F.3d 1173, 1179 (9th Cir. 2005) (head 
injuries); Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1064–65 (N.D. Ill. 
2005) (video game–caused aggression); Allen v. Bloomfield Hills Sch. Dist., 760 N.W.2d 
811, 814–17 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (physical manifestation of PTSD); Fini v. Gen. Motors 
Corp., No. 227592, 2003 WL 1861025, at *2–6 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2003) (head 
injuries); Van Middlesworth v. Century Bank & Trust Co., No. 215512, 2000 WL 33421451, 
at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. May 5, 2000) (incompetency to contract). 
 306. Similarly, defendants will be able to dispute the claim using a range of evidence.  
For example, numerous psychological tests have been developed to detect an individual’s 
malingering psychiatric injury or illness, with varying levels of success. See, e.g., Jascha 
Rüsseler et al., The Effect of Coaching on the Simulated Malingering of Memory 
Impairment, 8 BMC NEUROLOGY 37, 37 (2008) (successfully using response times in short-
term memory test to predict malingering, but method susceptible to coached patients); 
Fredric E. Rose et al., A Comparison of Four Tests of Malingering and the Effects of 
Coaching, 13 ARCHIVES CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 349, 358 (1998) (Portland Digit 
Recognition Test-Computerized correctly identified 70 percent of coached patients).  It is 
particularly easy to malinger PTSD because diagnosis relies largely on the patient’s 
subjective self-reporting of their symptoms, although tests have been developed to determine 
malingering in those patients. See Khodabakhsh Ahmadi et al., Malingering and PTSD:   
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finding.  We are at the point at which the jury can adequately distinguish 
fraudulent and frivolous claims from legitimate ones—at least as much as 
for other tort claims—without having to set up artificial and arbitrary 
barriers to do the job for them.307  This approach will allow judges and 
juries to take “invisible” harm as seriously as more visible physical harm.  
Courts can control jury decision making through traditional means:  using 
jury instructions to correct cultural prejudices; using dispositive motions 
and directed verdicts if no reasonable jury could find injury; and using 
remittitur or ordering a new trial if the jury’s damages awards seem 
excessive.  Furthermore, trivial claims would receive trivial damages, the 
same recognition that trivial physical claims receive.308 
In that way, it reasserts corrective justice concerns that have been 
downplayed or absent from the NIED claim.  From a corrective justice (and 
civil recourse) point of view, individuals should have access to the courts 
for harm resulting from another’s civil wrong.  For over a century, we have 
limited that access.  As the dissent stated in Daniel Ware’s case, in arguing 
to reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for a 
trial: 
For Daniel to be left without a remedy under all the undisputed facts in 
this case is antithetical to the general policy of tort liability in Anglo-
American jurisprudence:  those who are legitimately injured due to the act 
or omissions of others should have a remedy in our courts.309 
As the recognition of emotional harm evolves, so too should the tort. 
Yet, we cannot ignore the instrumentalist concerns that surround this 
claim.  While fraud and frivolous lawsuits can be addressed through 
evidence and procedure, those same mechanisms may not work to control 
potentially unlimited liability, and as noted above, may need to be 
addressed through limited duty rules.310 
Exposure to liability depends both on the severity of harm suffered by an 
individual victim and the number of injured victims.311  Tort law 
traditionally addresses the severity of harm through the eggshell plaintiff 
 
Detecting Malingering and War Related PTSD by M-FAST, 13 BMC PSYCHIATRY 154, 154 
(2013) (Miller Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test). 
 307. See Rhee, supra note 27, at 832–35 (noting that the vast amount of insurance fraud 
involves claims for property damage, physical injury, and economic loss; that pain and 
suffering for whiplash or other soft tissue injuries, which are no more difficult to fake than 
mental harm, have been widely accepted historically; that courthouses are replete with 
marginal cases, filed for various purposes including settlement and harassment, but that 
courts have learned how to separate out fraudulent from legitimate claims; also enumerating 
other disincentives to bring fraudulent claims). 
 308. Mulheron, supra note 198, at 99 n.165.  Handford and Mullany argue that if minor 
physical injury is recognizable, a comparatively minor emotional harm should be recognized 
as well, distinguishing the ranking of the claim through a smaller award. See HANDFORD & 
MULLANY, supra note 208, at 82–85. 
 309. Ware v. ANW Special Educ. Coop., 180 P.3d 610, 622 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008). 
 310. Although this concern traces directly back to the distributive justice idea that 
physical harm is more important than mere emotional harm, and could be challenged on that 
basis, I do not address that question here. 
 311. See Rhee, supra note 27, at 837. 
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rule, even for claims it tries to limit through duty rules, like NIED.  
Limitations of recoverable damages typically occur through other 
governmental mechanisms, such as a limit on statutory damages, which 
imposes such value judgment through the legislative process.312 
The core problem that should be addressed by limited duty rules involves 
the aggregate number of claims that could potentially be brought.  Although 
tort law traditionally addresses this concern through the three major 
elements of a tort suit—duty, causation, and proximate cause—the common 
law of NIED has addressed the problem largely by limiting duty through a 
series of artificial and arbitrary barriers.  This is effective in limiting 
exposure to a more specific number of plaintiffs, but it has proven to be too 
much protection; the barriers are no longer—if they ever were—
theoretically supportable.  The practical effect of the proposal advanced in 
this Article may well be that the number of plaintiffs who could potentially 
recover will be enlarged, as a trade-off for the institutional advantage of 
allowing jurors, rather than judges, to decide the validity of claims in this 
area as well the theoretical advantage of opening the door further to 
corrective justice. 
Traditionally, physical harm is distinguished from mental harm in one 
significant aspect from a legal standpoint—physical injuries are 
circumscribed by time and space and the laws of physics.  In other words, 
when a negligent driver strikes a victim, the physical injuries that result can 
be more readily anticipated.  But the view that “invisible” emotional 
injuries that may result may not be as limited by the laws of physics and 
therefore less predictable313 is beginning to change in the face of scientific 
 
 312. See, e.g., 13 GEORGIA JURISPURDENCE PERSONAL INJURY & TORTS § 11:66 (1995) 
(placing a $250,000 statutory cap on punitive damages in the absence of an allegation and 
finding of specific intent to cause harm); Carol A. Crocca, Validity, Construction, and 
Application of State Statutory Provisions Limiting Amount of Recovery in Medical 
Malpractice Claims, 26 A.L.R.5th 245 (1995) (numerous states impose limits on non-
economic damages in medical malpractice suits); see also, e.g., 1 CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST 
STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT § 6:13 (2014) (showing numerous states have statutory 
damage caps on suits brought against governmental agencies); Tim Snider, COPYRIGHT:   
Statutory Damages—Limit on Punitive Damages Award, LAWLETTER, 
http://www.nlrg.com/public-law-legal-research/bid/86884/COPYRIGHT-Statutory-
Damages-Limit-on-Punitive-Damages-Award (last visited Mar. 25, 2015) (explaining that a 
single instance of copyright infringement can be awarded no less than $750 and no more 
than $30,000, unless the infringement was willful in which case up to $150,000 can be 
awarded).  Courts also have imposed limits on damages, particularly in the punitive damages 
area. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 579–83 (1996) (suggesting a 
10:1 ratio of punitive to compensatory damages to meet constitutional concerns).  
Neuroscience advances will challenge the misconception that individuals experience pain 
similarly. Adam J. Kolber, Pain Detection and the Privacy of Subjective Experience, 33 AM. 
J.L. & MED. 433, 437–38 (2007).  Acknowledging these differences may lead courts 
examining NIED torts to focus more on the defendant’s negligent conduct and less on how a 
“normal” or “reasonable” person would react to the experience.  This would more closely 
align to recognition of physical and property damage. Id.  Or, even if courts resist this route 
to allow more subjectivity into the NIED analysis, then neuroscience may eventually help us 
to define the normative question of acceptable social behavior by empirically demonstrating 
average reactions to stress. Grey, supra note 18, at 228. 
 313. See Rhee, supra note 27, at 841. 
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advances suggesting the physicality of those harms.  A related issue is that 
reactions may be delayed.314  As such, this proposal may open the door to 
more cancerphobia claims.  In particular, if the claim is based on the 
“special relationship” between a company and its workers who have been 
exposed to a toxin, it is likely that more claims will reach the jury.  But this 
is not a new problem.  For example, toxic exposure cases, such as asbestos 
and diethylstilbestrol (DES), have presented a similar knot, and courts have 
developed ways to handle large numbers of claims that may take a long 
time to manifest (such as through a proximate cause analysis).315 
Another way to address the instrumentalist concerns of limiting frivolous 
and trivial lawsuits could be through pleadings requirements on damages.  
Although traditionally plaintiffs do not need to plead a specific amount of 
damages in their complaint, a state could statutorily require allegation of a 
certain level of damages.  This would allow courts to strike the pleadings 
under a motion to dismiss analysis316 for complaints that only include 
nominal damages, which would serve to inhibit trivial claims.317 
This proposal may be criticized on the basis that it simply shifts the 
limited duty barriers to address other areas and does not eliminate them 
altogether.  On one level, this criticism is apt—the test only removes the 
barriers for validity questions.  On another level, however, it focuses more 
sharply the purpose of the barriers, and more properly resurrects the role of 
the jury in this area. 
The proposal also could be criticized for allowing too many claims to go 
to the jury and not effectively curtailing the defendant’s exposure to 
liability.  True, it may very well allow more plaintiffs to be eligible for 
recovery.  But, more importantly, it allows compensation for deserving 
victims and thus more fully satisfies the corrective justice theory of tort law.  
At the same time, it more effectively deters undesirable behavior by 
allowing more social behavior to be reached by the common law claim.318 
 
 314. See, e.g., NAT’L COLLABORATING CTR. MENTAL HEALTH, POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS 
DISORDER:   THE MANAGEMENT OF PTSD IN ADULTS AND CHILDREN IN PRIMARY AND 
SECONDARY CARE § 2.1.3 (2005), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/ 
PMH0015848/pdf/TOC.pdf (noting that in some cases PTSD symptoms may not set in for 
years after the traumatic event). 
 315. See, e.g., Menne v. Celotex Corp., 861 F.2d 1453, 1462–64 (10th Cir. 1988) 
(applying proximate cause analysis to manage asbestos cases); Tracey I. Batt, DES Third-
Generation Liability:  A Proximate Cause, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1217, 1250–51 (1996) 
(claiming that traditional notions of proximate cause are sufficient to fairly handle DES 
cases). 
 316. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 317. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORTS 345–46 (2010) (describing 
use of nominal damages).  Or if trivial claims go forward, the degree of injury could be 
recognized by giving a lower level of damages to acknowledge the weaker claim. See supra 
note 309 and accompanying text. 
 318. It also could be argued that allowing a broader-based negligence action would 
eviscerate the claim of IIED, since there would be no incentive to plead the intentional tort. 
See Crump, supra note 37, at 454–55.  But that dichotomy is true of other broad-based 
negligence as opposed to intentional torts.  As with other intentional torts, plaintiffs would 
have the availability of punitive damages, which can create a strong incentive for plaintiffs 
to seek recourse under the intentional tort.  Further, if the tort occurs in the workplace, 
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CONCLUSION 
For over a century, courts have struggled to accommodate conflicting 
views of emotional harm stemming from negligence.  These struggles have 
not been distinguished by their logical consistency or their persuasive 
analysis.  But one thing has remained constant:  courts have exercised their 
power to shape the contours of recovery for emotional harm and have 
consistently shielded defendants from liability based on an array of 
justifications that stem from distrust of the claim to faulty science to fear of 
open-ended liability.  As we attempt to move beyond this rigid conception 
of emotional harm, the law’s respect for a defendant’s rights should be 
matched by an enforceable respect for a plaintiff’s rights. 
The evolving notions of our views on emotional harm—from scientific, 
medical, and normative perspectives—make this an appropriate time for 
courts to reconsider these longstanding practices.  Difficulties of proof of 
harm should not deprive the plaintiff of the opportunity to try to convince 
the trier of fact of the truth of his or her claim.  We can test the validity of 
the claim of emotional harm the way we address it for other negligence-
based torts; the fears about the genuineness of the claim may be dispelled 
with fundamental common law principles in negligence, procedure, and 
evidence.  Common law courts should trust these principles. 
 
pursuing the negligence tort may be precluded by workers’ compensation schemes, whereas 
the intentional tort may not be precluded. 
